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Preface 
The purpose of the project behind this report is to obtain more understanding of corruption in 
international markets, particularly by exploring the perspectives of firms, their challenges, 
their experiences and their preferred strategies. The study consists of three parts, (i) interviews 
at executive level in seven large firms, (ii) a business-survey, where 82 firms with a 
headquarter in Norway responded to a questionnaire, and (iii) a survey of Norwegian 
embassies outside the OECD-region.  
 
The report is part of my PhD project at the Norwegian School of Economics and Business 
Administration (NHH), under the supervision of Kjetil Bjorvatn. The preparatory studies for 
the project where carried out under the guidance of Susan Rose-Ackerman during my research 
stay at Yale Law School in 2003. The PhD project, including the stay at Yale University, is 
financed by the Norwegian Research Council.  
 
Both the business survey and the embassy survey were carried out in collaboration with The 
Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry (NHO). This is the largest business-
association in Norway, and organises more than 16000 enterprises ranging from small family-
owned businesses to large industrial enterprises. NHO has assisted all parts of this project 
appreciably, most critically by addressing top managers and embassies. Despite its obvious 
interest in promoting Norwegian industry, NHO has remained neutral in this research, 
awaiting the results without influencing any conclusions. Persons in the NHO administration 
who have been involved in this project are mainly Jon Vea, Erik Lundeby, Kaia Lie Petterson, 
Ingebjørg Harto and Anniken Tømte.  
 
Being an empirical study, the project has involved many individuals. I am deeply grateful to 
all the persons in the companies who responded to the quite extensive business survey 
questionnaire. Prior to the mail survey, I had meetings with representatives of seven firms: 
ABB, Statoil, Telenor, Jotun, Aker Kværner, Eidesvik Shipping and DNV (Det Norske 
Veritas). I am very grateful for their support.  
 
The embassy survey was dependent on the cooperative attitude of the Norwegian 
ambassadors. I am particularly thankful to Christian Fougner, First Secretary at the 
Norwegian embassy in Sri Lanka, who also contributed to the project by collecting 
information from joint ventures between Norwegian and Sri Lankan firms.  
 
Finally, the project has benefited substantially from comments from and interesting 
discussions with Kalle Moene, who is also supervising my PhD project, Tone Ognedal, Jens 
Andvig, Jacob Svensson, Tor-Inge Baldersheim, Claudio Abramo Weber, Thor Søreide, 
Birthe Taraldset, Chris Woodruff, Åse Grødeland, Jennifer Arlen, Helge Kvamme, John Bray, 
Fredrik Galtung, my husband Olav Roald Hansen and with many of my colleagues at CMI, 
especially Odd-Helge Fjeldstad and Arne Wiig.  
 
Bergen, November 2004 
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Executive summary  
Six issues motivate the study: (1) The choices firms make when experiencing a business 
climate that is worse than expected prior to entry; (2) the reluctance to speak out on 
corruption; (3) the link between corruption and market power; (4) the impact of improved 
procurement procedures; (5) the grey zones of facilitation payments, marketing and political 
pressure; and (6) the firms’ revealed business strategies versus their expressed attitudes and codes 
of conduct.  
Methodology 
The survey consists of three parts: (1) A pilot study with interviews with business leaders in 
seven large firms; (2) a mail-survey in which 82 executives in private firms with headquarters 
in Norway responded to a questionnaire; and (3) an embassy study in which Norwegian 
embassies in countries outside the OECD area responded to a smaller questionnaire. NHO 
contributed appreciably throughout the project.  
Norwegian industry is an interesting case for a study like this. It is international and 
outward oriented, several of the most important sectors are among the more exposed to 
corruption and undue business practices. Norway is still evaluated as a country where 
corruption is rare and where new anti-corruption rules are well implemented. The conflict of 
interest experienced when entering challenging markets with the ambition of respecting rules 
and regulations, is probably familiar to many of the respondents in this project.  
The perspective of embassies 
Most of the embassy representatives describe a rather discouraging picture of the local 
business climate in their specific countries of operation. Corruption appears to be a real 
business constraint, and firms will, according to this survey, lose contracts if they do not 
adjust their business practices to local informal conventions. Some embassy representatives 
would even recommend practices that would not be accepted in Norway. Nevertheless, most 
of the embassies will not tolerate corruption, and certainly not the involvement of Norwegian 
firms. Most of them are also ready to raise the issue of corruption at higher political levels.  
In Sri Lanka, the Norwegian embassy collected information from 10 joint ventures. The 
firms describe corruption as a real obstacle to business. In spite of this, many of the firms find 
it possible to operate without getting involved in corruption.  
Norwegian firms’ experience of corruption 
Two-thirds of the respondents in the business survey think or are convinced that they have 
lost a contract due to corruption. One-third have decided not to operate in a specific country 
because of corruption or similar problems. 42% find unethical business practices to be 
common in certain areas, and 32% frequently experience a gap between formal and informal 
rules in some of their markets of operation. 
The legal status of facilitation payments, irregular payments “to get things done”, is not 
clear to most respondents. In addition, 27% find that gifts are required for them to be able to 
operate in certain markets. Around 10% of the respondents admit to having accepted a request 
for payment from an agent, an adviser or a consultant that has most likely been used for 
bribery. Another 6% say that they probably have done so.  
The respondents’ attitude to corruption does not appear to be the same in all markets. A 
majority finds Scandinavian firms to be just as likely to meet demands for bribes as 
competitors from countries with higher levels of corruption. FDI firms are more exposed to 
corruption than exporting firms.  
 vii 
The survey results find a correlation between competitive pressure and exposure to 
corruption; i.e. the fiercer the competition, the higher the likelihood of being involved in 
corruption. Firms that find it hard to make profits are also more likely to find bribes a 
prerequisite for doing business in some markets.  
Given the selection of firms in this study, larger firms are more exposed to corruption than 
smaller or medium-sized firms. The sectors most exposed to corruption are, according to this 
survey, ‘heavy industry’, ‘oil, gas and power transmission’ and ‘telecoms and IT’.  Of the 82 
responding companies, 16 have carried out aid-funded projects. Half of these have the 
impression that corruption is more common in aid-funded projects than in non-aid projects. 
Of these 16 firms, 7 find no difference between aid and non-aid projects. Only one firm has 
the impression that aid business is “cleaner” than non-aid ventures.  
International tenders and corruption  
The difference between marketing strategies and corruption is not clear. A significant 
proportion of the firms offer clients gifts or excursions tha t may have a considerable private 
value for the beneficiary. Many firms are also asked to advise the client on technical aspects 
of tender specifications, a situation that also creates opportunities to influence the client. A 
majority of the companies do not believe that tender rules prevent corruption, and 41% of the 
respondents say that tender specifications are occasionally designed to fit with the offer of one 
specific company (predestination).  
One third of the companies report having experienced that a competitor has won a 
contract by means of political pressure, circumstances that resemble corruption. Quid pro quo, 
or local contents, should usually not be mixed up with corruption. It is reported that 18% 
often meet a demand for a quid pro quo, while 33% rarely do so.  
Strategic choices in the presence of corruption 
Many firms experience a conflict of interest when operating in markets where corruption is 
more common. Wishing to operate in accordance with both local and international law, they 
are worried about the consequences if only competitors pay bribes. The group of firms that 
finds it difficult to respect the law are also the most informed on the OECD anti-bribery 
convention.  
A majority of the firms (58%) says that corruption is never acceptable (18% find it 
acceptable only if there is no other way of operating in the market). However, most of the 
firms would not lodge an appeal if a competitor paid a bribe, many of them because 
“corruption is part of the game”. The most reported reason for keeping quiet when 
encountering bribery is not the lack of proof, but rather a concern for future business co-
operation. A firm’s propensity to react or complain about corruption decreases the more 
experience it has in international markets.  
As most firms prefer not to speak out when losing contracts because of corruption, they 
have to chose between exiting from the specific market or to making some kind of adjustment 
to local practices. Only 5% prefer to leave the market under such circumstances. Agents, local 
contacts and advisers are important when entering new markets. However, ties to relevant 
decision-makers appear to be their most important quality. Their ability to deal with local 
formalities is also highly regarded.  
The respondents were asked to suggest the most typical purposes of bribery and undue 
business practices. The alternatives most frequently suggested were: (1) Obtaining the 
contract through direct negotiations; (2) secret information about evaluation or tender 
specifications; (3) secret information about the other companies’ bids; and (4) adjustments in 
tender specifications. The respondents were also asked to suggest the “underlying motivation” 
behind bribery. The alternative most often suggested was “the fear of losing contracts because 
someone else has bribed the decision-makers”.  
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Internal control and measures 
About one-third of the responding firms, mostly large firms, have codes of conduct to prevent 
employees from paying bribes. A larger number of the respondents, 48%, have, reportedly, 
routines to detect corruption. Half of these firms (of the 48%) consider their routines to be 
efficient, and 13% say that they have actually caught an employee being corrupt.  
Among the firms that have an anti-corruption code of conduct, 31% say that they would 
adjust their strategies to the local business culture if they were losing contracts because of 
corruption. This study finds no support for the theory that firms with codes of conduct are less 
likely to lose contracts because of corruption. In fact, operating in line with anti-corruption 
codes of conduct implies the cost of losing contracts.  
Most respondents, all with some executive responsibility, claim that they would have been 
informed if a bribe had been offered on behalf of the firm to obtain a contract: 18% have still 
considered it a benefit not to be informed if an agent applies his compensation to questionable 
payments.  
Involvement in corruption is usually the result of an executive decision, and the risk 
connected with corruption is mainly related to the problem of being caught in the crime. 
Firms that carry out projects as a joint venture or consortium face the additional risk of having 
cooperating firms influencing clients in unethical manners, a problem experienced by several 
responding firms. The respondents are generally reluctant to discuss issues of corruption with 
persons outside the company. Only 11% would involve the police and only one firm would 
allow external investigations by a committee or a consultant if a serious violation of ethical 
rules were detected.  
Most firms say that their attitudes to corruption have remained unchanged for a long time, 
implying that they do not tolerate corruption. Most of them also consider corruption to be on 
the decrease. In spite of this, only 27% of the firms find competition in their industry less 
unfair and biased than before.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Corruption, new rules, risk and incentives 
For some time now, there seems to have been broad agreement that corruption is one of the 
most serious problems in the world today. Politicians in most countries have introduced 
programs to combat this crime, multinationals encourage their employees to avoid unethical 
business practices, and the international community has proposed common cross-border anti-
corruption regulations. It is therefore a puzzle why we, in spite of these considerable and 
united efforts, have no obvious reason to assume that international business corruption is on 
the decrease.   
 
It is perhaps premature to evaluate the general impact of the relatively new international anti-
corruption conventions. The OECD convention against bribery of foreign public officials in 
international business transactions has been in effect since February 1999. The UN 
convention, an agreement on the criminalisation of a broad range of corruption-related 
activities and co-operation on investigation, was introduced in 2003. New rules may take 
some years to have a bearing on attitudes and choices, particularly when being introduced in a 
field where rules in international markets have been inconsistent and not the same for all 
competitors, where firms have referred to moral justifications for breaking the law, and where 
politicians and states have been unconvincing in their efforts to combat this crime.  
 
Even so, it is not too early to discuss the possible impacts of these initiatives on firms’ actual 
choices. New rules will, of course, have some influence on the moral principles of many 
business leaders, thereby increasing their integrity and their conformity to professional 
standards of conduct. Other executives must be expected to calculate probable gains against 
possible losses, including when it comes to illegal or unethical practices. New international 
regulations have probably increased the cost of being caught in corrupt practice. However, 
estimating expected risk as a function of both cost and probability, the likely consequences of 
taking part in corruption are not much changed by the new rules, unless the probability of 
being detected in the crime also increases.  
 
Increasing the actual risk of corruption is a considerable challenge for two simple reasons, 
both of them to do with incentives. Firstly, the probability of being subject to local 
prosecution because of corruption is generally low. Obviously, bribes are more frequently 
offered in countries where corruption is common. And if corruption is common, the risk of 
being detected is lower because there are so many cases for the police to investigate. Besides, 
once detected in corruption, the chances of having charges withdrawn by bribing the 
prosecutor, or someone above the prosecutor, increases with the level of corruption. 
Accepting corruption may also ensure a certain level of income for individuals in key 
positions, and hence diminish their motivation to react against this crime (Andvig and Moene, 
1990). 
 
Secondly, the implementation of the OECD anti-bribery convention on cross-border business 
transactions makes it illegal to offer bribes to public officials in foreign countries. However, 
most states wish to increase the probability of “their” domestic companies getting contracts in 
foreign countries. Many politicians even make significant efforts to influence foreign states to 
encourage them to prefer “their” domestic firms when making decisions on costly 
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investments, an influence that in many cases resembles corruption. When most politicians 
assume, and also accept, that the way of doing business varies across the globe, it is relevant 
to question their incentives to encourage investigations on “their own” firms, even if contracts 
are obtained in a way that allegedly is unacceptable. The number of cases based on the OECD 
convention, internationally, is, accordingly, almost none. When the enforcement of new rules 
is the responsibility of each individual jurisdiction, it has, repeatedly, proved difficult to put 
new international conventions into effect. 
 
The consequences of corruption, and the challenge of controlling it, have motivated research, 
and the literature on corruption has increased significantly during the past decade. We have 
small scale studies that describe mechanisms of corruption in one specific country, sector or 
market, most often in developing countries. This kind of research is important in supporting 
or disproving more general assumptions about corruption, or just improving local anti-
corruption policy. In contrast to the micro-oriented projects, we have large-scale studies that 
describe cross-country correlations between corruption and other phenomena, such as 
economic growth, legal traditions, religion, inequality, etc.1 Conclusions based on this 
research will be subject to the ability of corruption indices to estimate actual levels of 
corruption. These studies will need to be complemented by other perspectives in order to 
provide information about relevant econometric causalities.  
 
What we now also need, to better understand international corruption, is more research on 
how the different facets of globalisation, such as the increase of international trade, cross-
border competition, and legislative co-operation, affect the differences in business climates 
across the globe and the strategic choices of the players. The World Bank’s business surveys 
are important contributions in this respect (Batra et al, 2003). Nevertheless, a number of 
issues related to corruption and similar problems are not included in these studies.  
1.2  Key questions  
Given this background, the present literature on the issues, and various discussions with 
persons mentioned in the preface, the present project aims to exp lore six related topics.  
1.2.1 Choice of strategy in challenging business climates 
Firms that operate in developing countries will sometimes experience a business climate that 
is worse than expected prior to entry into the specific market. Corruption may be more or less 
visible at several levels, the number of start-up procedures high and difficult to get through, 
property rights poorly protected and difficult to register, or the judicial system may function 
too poorly to enable the enforcement of contracts.2 These bureaucratic obstacles seem to be 
correlated to the level of corruption. While a bribe may simplify the procedures, it also 
preserves the mechanisms and incentives behind the barriers.  
 
Many firms find it difficult to make the right choices under such circumstances. When finding 
themselves repeatedly losing contracts because of corruption, or because there are some 
invisible ties between clients and competitors, they basically have three options:  
 
                                                 
1 See Rose-Ackerman (1999, 2004) for a detailed classification of challenges related to corruption, the empirical 
literature, and anti-corruption policy measures. Papers are available at the web pages of several institutions, such 
as the World Bank, Transparency International, UNICRI and U4.   
2 World Bank (2005) provides an overview of geographical variations in such business obstacles.  
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i) Exit and leave the country, forget about lost investments, and aim for alternative 
markets.  
ii) Complain about the circumstances, speak out and try to improve the underlying 
situation for the better.  
iii)  Adjust to the local business climate. Make the right contacts, be patient, perhaps 
offer a bribe if that seems required.  
 
The present study aims at more understanding of these choices. Which solution is the most 
preferred, and why? Is it common to leave a specific market because of corruption? Why do 
firms seem unwilling to act against corruption? Is it possible to make profits in a market 
where corruption is common without taking part in any kind of unethical business practice? 
1.2.2 Why not speak out? 
A particularly interesting question relates to the reluctance to complain, mentioned above, 
when contracts have obviously been lost because of corruption. There are alternative channels 
for responding to the crime. A firm can follow formal procedures, and lodge an appeal to the 
client or the tender authorities. How many firms do so? It can encourage local authorities to 
take a closer look at the deal. Given sufficient proof, it can itself bring the case to court, either 
locally or in the home country of the bribing firm. Other options are to go through intelligence 
services, embassies, newspapers or anti-corruption groups, or just submit a letter of complaint 
to the firm that has paid a bribe. Does it ever happen?  
 
These matters are important because firms are often the most likely to understand that 
corruption takes place between a competitor and a client. A higher probability of reactions 
from competitors may have a vital impact on the actual risk of corruption, and may therefore 
have an influence on firms’ propensity to offer bribes.  
1.2.3 Competition and corruption 
The link between competition and corruption is not clear in the relevant literature. It has been 
argued that market power enables corruption because net profits are required to cover the 
expenses of making bribe payments. However, empirical studies that find a positive 
correlation between corruption and market power may have failed to include an important 
dynamic aspect. Firms in competitive markets pay bribes to obtain market power, and change 
thereby the industrial organisation. Given such correlations, it can thus still be the case that 
competitive pressure leads to a higher propensity to offer bribes. Besides, the amount offered 
in a bribe can be covered by the total contract. The actual cost of making a bribe payment will 
often depend on the relative bargaining power of those involved.  
1.2.4 The ability of procurement rules to reduce corruption 
Many countries have reformed their procurement procedures in recent years in order to ensure 
fair and unbiased competition for public contracts. Corruption represents a critical threat to 
the attainment of this objective. Bribery- induced violations of procurement procedures can 
basically be categorised in two groups:  
 
(i)  Hidden violations of procurement rules: it looks like as if the rules have been 
respected.  
(ii)  Legitimate deviations from procurement procedures: rules of exception are too 
frequently exploited.  
 
The project aims at more understanding of different forms of corruption in each of these 
categories, and explores the efficiency of procurement rules in preventing corruption. The 
presence of procurement procedures will often reduce the individual authority of public 
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officials to award contracts. The purpose of bribes will therefore be to increase the probability 
of obtaining the contract, but without a guarantee of success in the tender procedure. These 
changes may impact on the means of influencing a client, as well as the size of bribes and 
other inducements.   
 
The study explores the perceived impact of procurement procedures on controlling corruption 
in tenders for public contracts. To understand possible obstacles to free and fair competition, 
the survey also aims at revealing the more underlying motivation behind bribery, while 
recognising the obvious search for revenues.  
1.2.5 Grey zones   
The definition of corruption varies, in layman’s language as well as in legal terms. There are 
different forms of corruption, they have different consequences, and the tolerance of 
corruption will often vary with the actual circumstances. This study explores three areas in 
which the judicial status of corruption is unclear, where influence is very similar to 
corruption, and where the persons involved typically defend the practices as not being corrupt.  
 
(i) Facilitation payments, smaller bribes paid to get things done. The defence of 
facilitation payments is often based on a lack of bargaining power.  
(ii) Marketing targeted at specific individuals, where expensive gifts and excursions are 
offered to encourage informal relations with the potential client. Many firms claim this 
kind of marketing to be essential. 
(iii)  Political pressure, for instance in the form of subsidies, export-credit deals or aid, 
sometimes also presented as threats of political sanctions. These practices are difficult 
to attack legally, as they are carried out by political leaders at the highest state level.  
1.2.6 Business strategies versus codes of conduct  
A visible and unquestionable attitude against corruption is important to prevent the temptation 
of bribery. However, the promises of business leaders and the words in their codes of conduct 
will not always have an impact on their actual incentives and choices.  
 
This project includes a study of various measures introduced internally in firms to prevent 
corruption, such as codes of conduct, control routines and the choices made if actually 
experiencing a scandal related to corruption. These issues are discussed in the light of the 
firms’ preferred strategies when operating in challenging business climates.  
1.3  This project, this report 
The research questions were explored empirically by conducting a business-survey on 
corruption in international markets, as experienced by Norwegian firms. The project was 
complemented by a survey of Norwegian embassies in countries outside the OECD region. 
Both the business survey and the embassy survey were carried out in collaboration with The 
Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry (NHO). 
 
There are obvious problems related to empirical investigations on such a sensitive subject, 
and the reliability of the answers collected is uncertain. The respondents have incentives to 
protect the reputation of their sector and Norwegian firms in general. Bribery is usually 
known to only a very small number of persons, and might also be hidden from high- level 
employees. The lack of actual knowledge about the phenomenon makes it probable that many 
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respondents base their beliefs on occasional incidents. It may even induce some respondents 
to overstate the problem and claim corruption to be more widespread than it really is.3  
 
Nevertheless, the fight against corruption is crucial in making markets function in a welfare-
enhancing manner, particularly in developing countries, and we need nuanced information 
from people with experience in international business to be able to identify efficient measures. 
It is important to be aware, however, when designing and interpreting surveys on corruption, 
of the fact that such results, for various reasons, are biased. One of the goals of the present 
survey design is to base the value of the material on what people say, while recognising its 
limitations in reflecting the firms’ actual choices. Most of the questions still relate to issues 
about which the respondents are quite likely to tell the truth.  
 
Restricting the survey to Norway-based firms represents a limitation to the generality of the 
results. This choice is due to the cost and difficulty of obtaining responses to a relatively 
extensive questionnaire from a large number of firms. The constructive attitude of and 
assistance from NHO has been important in obtaining data from firms in Norway. Similar 
assistance from business organisations in various countries cannot be expected. However, 
given one country in conducting this survey, Norway happen to be a good choice.  
 
Norwegian industry is international and outward oriented, and well exposed to international 
attitudes and business cultures. Several of the most important sectors of operation are 
perceived to be among the more exposed to corruption, such as oil and gas, power 
transmission, construction and IT. Norway as a nation is still scoring well on international 
corruption rankings (Kaufman et al., 2003; Transparency International, 2003), and is also 
commended by OECD for its implementation of the new anti-bribery convention (OECD, 
2004). The challenge of facing corruption in international markets, combined with a more 
restrictive legislation, is therefore well known to many Norwegian firms.  
 
The topics surveyed are explored in depth, asking close to 100 questions in the business 
survey questionnaire. 82 persons in top management have responded, while 12 persons in 
seven firms with significant experience in international markets have been interviewed. The 
size of the 82 firms varies significantly, 10 sectors are represented, and all the firms do 
business in markets in which corruption is perceived to be a significant problem.  
 
The business survey is not a large-sample study with statistical power and significant cross-
sectional variation for identifying levels of corruption. Nor is it a clinical experiment with 
opportunities for obtaining detailed information about a few cases. The advantage of the 
present study, where a business survey is complemented by interviews and a second survey of 
embassies, is its ability to ask specific and qualitative questions, resulting in new information 
about certain issues.  
 
The report is organised as follows. The executive summary, page v, describes the results very 
briefly. The embassy survey is presented right after this introduction in Section 2, before the 
business survey. This arrangement is made to provide some background information from 
actors other than firms, on the  perceived extent of corruption in non-OECD countries where 
Norwegian firms are likely to be present.  
                                                 
3 The comprehensive rankings of countries according to their perceived level of corruption are also exposed to 
this problem because they are based on individual surveys. Information about these rankings are provided by the 
authors of the two main indices, the World Bank and Transparency International, and made available on their 
home pages. Søreide (2003) provides an assessment of empirical information on corruption.  
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The business survey is presented right after the chapter on observations made by embassies. 
Section 3 describes methodological aspects of the survey, respondent characteristics and 
terminological issues.  The business respondents’ experiences with corruption and their own 
involvement are presented in Section 4. This section also describes some characteristics of 
firms that seem to be exposed to corruption.  
 
The focus of Section 5 is tender procedures. Various ways of influencing tenders are main 
issues, including some of the grey-zone practices. Section 6 describes the firms’ reported 
strategies when operating in markets where corruption is a common problem, their apparent 
tolerance to or disapproval of corruption, and the perceived purpose of bribery. Section 7 
reports on the responding firms’ internal control mechanisms, including the responsibility and 
options preferred if the firm actually has been involved in corruption. Section 8 concludes.  
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2  The embassy survey  
The perspective of embassies has seldom been systematically collected as a separate source of 
information on issues related to economic development. As far as is known to the author, 
there are no corruption surveys that apply such an approach. In this project, however, the 
responses from the embassies have great value. Embassy representatives usually reside in the 
country for a significant period of time, they observe its society with the eyes of foreigners 
and they take part in political gatherings. At the same time, they are expected to know the 
local markets and industries, in order to be able to advise home-country firms entering the 
local market, and to send information to home-country public institutions. In recent years, 
Norwegian embassies have also come to play a more important role in the assignment of 
(bilateral) aid-funded contracts. This specific role, as representatives for Norwegian 
authorities in countries where business practices often differ from those back home, makes it 
relevant to be aware of their views on the problem of corruption.   
2.1  Survey design  
The embassy survey is a mail survey. NHO distributed a questionnaire to 44 Norwegian 
embassies, while the responses were returned to CMI. 24 responses were received. The 
questionnaire can be found in Appendix 2. It asks nine questions related to the embassies’ 
perceptions on challenges related to local corruption, their ability to confront local authorities 
with the problem, and whether foreign firms are likely to take on business practices that 
would not be considered acceptable in their home country.  
 
The embassy survey respondents can be categorised according to the level of income in their 
country of operation. All the embassies that were approached by NHO to take part in the 
survey are outside the OECD region. 11 of the responding embassies are in developing 
countries, 13 in middle- income countries. The choice of category is made by the respondents 
themselves. For the sake of anonymity, the participating embassies can not be identified. The 
sensitivity of the issue also made it a challenge to formulate questions in a way that would not 
discourage the respondents from answering the questionnaire (see also Section 3.4 on 
terminology).  
2.2 Responses from Norwegian embassies in non-OECD countries 
2.2.1 A real business constraint  
Most of the 24 respondents in the embassy survey, i.e. representatives of embassies in  
various developing or middle income countries, described corruption as a real business 
constraint in their specific country of operation. Three respondents considered corruption 
seldom to be an issue in local business. 19 respondents said that corruption is frequently, often 
or always part of the business culture. 21 respondents would assume that Norwegian firms 
operating in the specific area are sometimes, frequently or often confronted with challenges 
related to illegitimate business practices, irregular payments and corruption.  
 
Studies made by the World Bank (Batra et al, 2003; World Bank, 2005) and  Transparency 
International (2004) describe clear differences between corruption in OECD and non-OECD 
countries. However, the extent of corruption seems to vary considerably within regions and 
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also in the ways of impeding business. A correlation between actual levels of corruption and 
GDP per capita  is not sufficiently documented (Weber, 2004).4  
2.2.2 Adjustment to local practices 
Adjustment to local practices and informal conventions will, according to the respondents, 
often imply business procedures that would be considered less acceptable in Norway. Only 
four respondents said that this is never or seldom the case. 18 respondents found the business 
climate in their country of operation clearly inferior to what they observe in Norway. These 
18 respondents also assumed that the refusal to make irregular or informal payments will 
reduce foreign firms’ opportunities to do business in the specific country. Several of the 
respondents added comments to the questionnaire and described the business climate more 
clearly. Two of them also warned that any business venture in their country of operation runs 
a high risk of being subject to corruption. 
 
Most of the embassy representatives assumed that some of the foreign firms that operate in 
the local market adopt business practices that most likely deviate from their own official 
codes of conduct. The embassy representatives were, however, cautious on this point. Only 
two respondents found this often to be the case, while 13 said it probably happens sometimes.  
 
The embassies were asked if they would recommend that Norwegian firms adjust to the local 
business culture, even if it could imply business behaviour that would not be accepted in 
Norway. Most of the respondents made a clear statement : 14 of them would never make such 
a recommendation, two of them would seldom do so, another two would maybe, and five 
respondents would sometimes make such recommendations. Given the presentation of the 
questionnaire, as part of a study on corruption, and the other questions that are more clearly 
related to corruption, it is reasonable to interpret this question (number 7, Appendix 2) as 
meaning whether the respondent would recommend some kind of bribery. Given that they are 
aware of this, it is disturbing that representatives of more than one third of the embassies 
included in this survey are in doubt on this issue, or, like five of them, actually prepared to 
give such an advice.  
 
Table 2.1: Response from embassies 
 
Question 
 
Affirmative 
response*, n=24 
 
How frequently do you think corruption is part of the business culture in your country of 
operation? 21 
Will adjustment to local informal conventions in your country of operation ever imply 
business procedures that would be considered less acceptable in Norway? 21 
Is it likely that the refusal to make irregular or informal payments might reduce the 
opportunities for foreign firms to do business in your country of operation? 19 
Would you recommend that Norwegian firms adjust to the local culture, even if it could 
imply business behaviour that would not be accepted in Norway?  8 
Given that a Norwegian firm has lost an important contract due to corruption, would you 
be willing to mention the issue to local authorities?  18 
*Note: “Affirmative response” to the questions asked implies the choice of answers such as frequently, yes, 
sometimes, often, certainly and probably, as opposed to no, never or seldom. The questionnaire is available in 
Appendix 2. Note also, 13 responses are made by embassies in middle income countries, 11 in developing 
countries. Even so, there is no notable difference in the responses from these two categories.  
                                                 
4 Weber (2004) analyses Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, and questions its ability to 
separate the level of corruption from the general level of welfare.  
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2.2.3 Raising objections at the political level 
Many firms hesitate to complain about corruption, even if bribery by a competitor has 
obviously made them lose an important contract. The outcome of a complaint is perhaps 
expected to be low, the firm prefers not to insult the client, or it is worried about sanctions by 
the bribing firm, or even from the business community.5 To encourage firms to make some 
kind of response when bribery does occur, and thereby underscore intolerance to corruption, it 
is important to identify alternative channels of speaking out about the problem. One such 
alternative channel for firms is to co-operate with the relevant embassy, and raise the issue of 
corruption at the political level.  
 
The propensity of the Norwegian embassies to co-operate with private firms under such 
circumstances is promising. 18 respondents would probably (6) or certainly (12) be ready to 
mention the issue to local authorities. Only five would not or probably not do so. 11 
embassies have actually made this kind of response, and raised the issue of corruption at a 
higher political level. Six of these eleven say they have done so several times.  
2.3  The perspective of Norwegian joint ventures in Sri Lanka 
The Norwegian embassy in Sri Lanka was particularly obliging, and collected information 
from several Sri Lankan Norwegian joint ventures, ten companies altogether. The embassy 
questionnaire (Appendix 2) was copied and distributed by the embassy to these firms. The 
embassy accordingly collected the responses and sent them to Norway. The information from 
this sub-survey happened to be valuable and is presented here in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 2.2: The response from ten joint ventures in Sri-Lanka 
 
Question 
Affirmative 
response*,  
 n=10 
How frequently do you think corruption is part of the business culture in your country of 
operation? 
8 
How often would you assume that Norwegian firms operating in the area are confronted with 
challenges related to illegitimate business practices, irregular payments and corruption? 
7 
Will adjustment to local informal conventions in your country of operation ever imply business 
procedures that would be considered less acceptable in Norway? 
3 
Is it likely that the refusal to make irregular or informal payments might reduce the opportunities 
for foreign firms to do  business in your country of operation?  
5 
Would you recommend that Norwegian firms adjust to the local culture, even if it could imply 
business behaviour that would not be accepted in Norway?  
5 
Given that a Norwegian firm has lost an important contract due to corruption, would you be 
willing to mention the issue to local authorities?  
10 
Note: There are ten respondents altogether in this ‘sub-survey’. *As in Table 3.1, an “affirmative response” to the 
questions asked implies the choice of answers such as frequently, yes, sometimes, often, certainly and probably, 
as opposed to no, never or seldom. The questionnaire is available in Appendix 2.  
 
Firstly, the ten firms have a varying view on corruption as a restriction on doing business. 
Most of them consider corruption to be a real business constraint in Sri Lanka. The 
disagreement relates to the necessity of taking part in corruption to be able to operate in the 
country. Five of the ten firms believed that a firm’s business opportunities might be reduced if 
it refuses to make irregular or informal payments. Five firms would also recommend that 
other Norwegian firms adjust to the local culture, even if this would imply business behaviour 
that would not be accepted in Norway. The other five firms portrayed a better picture on these 
                                                 
5  This issue is more elaborated on in Section 6.2. 
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two issues. According to these firms, it is possible to operate “cleanly” and honestly in Sri 
Lanka: they would certainly not recommend any undue business practices. This sub-survey 
lacks characterising information on the firms because they responded to the embassy 
questionnaire. Information which could explain the different perceptions is therefore not 
available.  
 
Secondly, all the firms are willing to mention the issue of corruption to local authorities. The 
question was meant for the embassies. When responded to by firms, it is interesting to note 
this attitude, as it deviates strongly from the attitudes reported in the business survey 
conducted in Norway. Section 6.2 describes a strong reluctance to complain about corrup tion 
in any way. The discrepancy can probably not be solely explained by the Sri Lankan joint 
ventures’ familiarity with local conditions. Many of the business survey respondents in 
Norway have decades of experience in developing country markets, and a number of them 
operate with joint ventures in various countries. The explanation is perhaps more related to a 
link between the Norwegian embassy and the joint venture firms that responded to the survey, 
and thus the embassy’s relations with the local authorities.   
 
Five of the firms say that they have in fact responded to corruption by raising the issue at a 
higher political level. In addition, eight of the ten firms “frequently” or “sometimes” notice 
that foreign firms that operate in the area make use of business practices that most likely 
deviate from their own codes of conduct. Although several of the joint venture respondents 
find it possible to operate without taking part in corruption, offences are regularly observed.  
 
Several of the respondents in this sub-survey made interesting comments in order to describe 
the business climate in Sri Lanka. A statement from one of those who will seldom recommend 
corruption is sited here, as it probably portrays a situation that is common to several 
developing countries.  
 
“In general, corruption is on three levels: the political level, the bureaucratic level and the 
working level.  
 
It is the working level corruption, which one encounters frequently in day-to-day operations, that 
actually hinders business operations. Complaining to a higher level resolves the issues for the 
time being but the issue crops up in another mode. This is an area where most of the foreign 
companies tend to find ways to adapt to local country situations.  
 
Bureaucratic corruption pops up occasionally , but with big demands. Refusal to bend would put 
forward long-term hassles, raising issues like non-compliance to policies and standards. As these 
so-called policies are vague and subject to interpretations in most developing countries, a 
parallel battle starts challenging the legalities of the stand. However, this doesn’t affect day-to-
day business, except that a parallel legal battle is on.  
 
Also political corruption pops up occasionally, but if ones business operation is ok with 
bureaucratic levels, it is possible to ignore and have a deaf ear to this segment. This ends up as 
an embarrassing hassle to the CEO or the chairman but still the action goes on.  
 
The worst is a mix-up of political and bureaucratic corruption at the same time and on the same 
issue”  
 
- Anonymous representative of a Norwegian-
Sri-Lankan joint venture in Sri-Lanka, 2004. 
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3-7 The business survey  
3 Methodology 
3.1 Survey design and interpretation of results 
The information collected by the business survey can be organised in five categories: (i) 
exposure to corruption, (ii) tender procedures, (iii) the motivation behind bribery, (iv) 
strategic choices in the presence of corruption, and (v) security and internal control 
mechanisms. The selection of topics is based on a review of the literature on corruption, 
feedback from recognised experts in the field, and a pilot study with interviews of business 
leaders. Meetings were arranged in seven large firms with senior staff with extensive 
international business experience, mainly from marketing and sales. In some of the firms, 
managers responsible for security and corporate social responsibility (CSR) where consulted.  
 
The pilot study was a necessary first step, and essential to obtaining the right terminology, 
understanding the likelihood of getting serious and honest answers, and recognising problems 
not given attention prior to the survey, but representing serious issues to the firms. The 
questionnaire was therefore developed to fit with the perspectives of firms. It was also 
designed with the goal of avoiding biases induced by the way questions were formulated and 
maximising the number of responses. The business survey questionnaire can be found in 
Appendix 1.  
 
The sensitivity of the topic made anonymity and confidentiality the two most important 
concerns when arranging for the delivery and response to the questionnaires. NHO distributed 
the questionnaire with a cover letter of recommendation, a three week deadline for return and 
an anonymous return envelope to be sent to CMI with the response. Around 500 CEOs of 
exporting firms received the questionnaire, most of them members of NHO. The list of firms 
was rather arbitrary, and the specific response rate is not very informing. Many of the firms 
appeared to be small and several sent us the message that they did not have enough 
experience to respond.  
 
Even so, given the length, nine pages with close to 100 questions, 82 responses, representing a 
response rate of 16-17%, compares favourably to the response rate of several comparable 
surveys on less sensitive issues. Graham and Harvey (2001), researching the theory and 
practice of corporate finance, obtained a response rate of 9% by using similar procedures, 
while defending their results as being general. A survey on topics close to the present study, 
carried out by Control Risk Group (CRG, 2002) in five countries, reports on the basis of 
responses from 50 firms in each country. Most of the countries included in the World Bank 
business environment survey (Batra et al., 2003) cover around 100 companies. The number 
varies significantly, and conclusions are also drawn for countries with far fewer than 100 
companies surveyed. The relatively high response rate in the present study, mainly from top 
managers or directors responsible for international sales, is obviously due to the support of 
NHO for the study. 
 
The selection of firms are not drawn completely by random, and the extent to which the 82 
responding firms actually represent the population, i.e. exporting firms in Norway, is 
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uncertain. The material is analysed by help of non-parametric statistics only, and the results 
will not allow for statistical generalisations about the extent to which firms are involved in 
corruption when operating in international markets, not even about Norwegian firms. Section 
3.2 informs about characteristics of the firms, and the degree to which the data represent the 
population can be considered in light of public statistics on Norwegian industry.  
 
What this material informs about, are the reported frequencies and cross-tabulations in the 
answers provided. This is interesting as it supports or disproves specific theories, and the 
results are able to increase our understanding of corruption and identify specific needs for 
further research. However, it is not unlikely that correlations found in this material also are 
present in a larger population. And, the reliability of empirical research on corruption can, as 
already mentioned, be uncertain in cases of statistical validity as well.  
 
To make the results easy to read, most numbers are presented in percentages, even if the 
number of respondents is below 100. Note therefore, 10% is the response from 8 persons. 
Most respondents have responded to all questions, and, n, the total number of responses to 
each question, is equal or close to 82 in all tables or presentations of the results.  
3.2  Summary of respondent characteristics 
3.2.1 The individuals responding to the business survey  
The respondents hold the following positions: 51% are managing directors; 38% are 
executives responsible for sales and marketing; 9% have an other function in the management 
group; and the remaining are either country managers or members of the board. The 
respondents are supposed to have direct responsibility for the firm’s main areas of operation, 
other than social responsibility, security issues or public relations.  
3.2.2 Experience from international markets 
Most of the respondents had significant experience in international business. 31% had 
operated abroad for more than 30 years, 46% for 10-30 years. 23% were less experienced, 
with fewer than 10 years of international engagement. This experience was collected 
throughout the world, although mostly in Europe and USA/Canada. Other regions were 
represented in the following order: East European countries and Central Asia, the rest of Asia 
except mainland China, Latin America and the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle 
East and North Africa, mainland China and Oceania. 42% of the firms produced goods 
outside Norway, 23% of the firms outside the OECD area. 64% did not trade or carry out 
projects for foreign governmental institutions, while about 35% did so often or sporadically.  
 
Comparing to numbers from public statistics, around 75% of Norwegian exports go to 
countries in the European Union. The amount of goods exported to the USA and Canada 
amounts to less than 10% of the total. Asian countries represent more important markets, 
importing around 11% of Norwegian exports while standing for a significantly higher share of 
Norwegian imports. China appears particularly important in this region. Export to Africa and 
South- America account for around 3% of total Norwegian exports, Botswana, South-Africa 
and Brazil are important countries in these regions. Main export articles, except from oil and 
gas, are various kinds of machinery, shipping, the construction of ships included, equipment 
for telecom, and computer technology. Raw metals, fish and fish products, chemical products 
and paper products represent other important export commodities. The European Union is the 
most important market also for Norwegian foreign direct investment (FDI). Norwegian FDI in 
developing countries are occasional, and specific patterns are not easily identified.  
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3.2.3 Size, sectoral composition and ownership 
45% of the responding firms have an annual turnover of less than NOK 100 million, from 
now on called small firms. 32% have sales of between NOK 100 and 1000 million, the 
medium sized firms. 23% are above NOK 1 billion in turnover, hereby called large firms (1 
billion NOK is about EUR 120 million).  
 
20% of the responding firms operate in construction, 20% in oil, gas and power transmission6, 
15% in agri/food industries, 13% in telecommunications and IT, 8% in heavy industry, 8% in 
other types of service, 6% in consulting and 5% in light manufacturing. Shipping, a 
significant part of Norwegian industry, is included in construction, oil, heavy industry or 
transportation, depending on their main group of clients. Tourism, transportation, civil 
aerospace, banking, finance, insurance and the pharmaceutical industry are sectors less 
represented among the respondents to this survey.  
 
When it comes to ownership, 73% of the total have mainly Norwegian ownership, 84% of the 
firms have their headquarters in Norway, while 18% have a state ownership share of more 
than 50%. The firms not owned by Norwegians are mainly owned by other Europeans. 
Almost 9% of the firms have their headquarters in another European country, while 6% are 
based in the USA or Canada. According to public statistics, the European Union stands for 
most of the FDI in Norway, most frequently represented by Sweden, the Netherlands and 
Denmark. Also US firms appear to represent a relatively large share of FDI in Norwegian 
industry.  
3.2.4  Competitive pressure 
Competitive pressure is important to understand the strategies of firms, still an aspect that is 
difficult to measure. This survey categorises firms in this sense, according to a question about 
their potential for making profits on their main products. Based on this question, Table 3.1 
indicates the competitive pressure among the responding firms.  
 
Table 3.1: Competitive pressure on prices 
Question  Answers  Frequency 
No 13% 
Generally not 31% 
Usually 38% 
Are the prices for your main products or services forced to a 
level that makes it hard to make profits? 
Yes 17% 
 
This is of course not an objective evaluation of competitive pressure, but rather based on the 
respondents’ own opinion. Given this measure, there is no clear pattern of competitive 
pressure on prices across sectors in this material. The indicated surplus varies considerably 
between firms within the same sector, except in agri/food industries, where a clear majority 
finds it difficult to make profits. The price pressure is also reported to be strong in 
construction, oil, gas and power transmission, while being lower in telecommunications /IT.  
 
Large firms do not come out as more exposed to pressure on prices than small firms. This is 
perhaps surprising as large firms often are expected to have some market power. However, 
competition may be fiercer in international markets and size categories different. In the 
categories of small and large firms, 65% and 58% respectively, find it hard to make profits. 
The other firms in these categories are in better positions to obtain revenues. In the category 
                                                 
6 For the sake of anonymity, oil and power are put together in the same category. 
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of medium-sized firms, two-thirds find it hard to make profits, while one-third are less 
pressured on prices.  
3.3 Terminology    
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2001) describes corruption as an act intended to give or derive 
advantage inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others. A bribe can thus be thought 
of as compensation to a representative of an institution for making a choice that deviates from 
the goal of that institution. Another common definition of corruption is, accordingly, the 
misuse of public office for private gain. The damage of this misuse lies in the influence of 
choices and the introduction of inefficiencies (Bardhan, 1997; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). The 
definition of corruption should therefore be wide enough to include several ways of obtaining 
the same goal, and not be technically concentrated on the transfer of bribe money. Recent 
judicial documents, such as the anti-corruption conventions of the Council of Europe, OECD 
and the United Nations7 allow for alternative ways of gaining influence by referring to actions 
that obviously have a “corrupt intention” or proposals for “improper advantage”.  
 
There is, in spite of vast improvements in the rules, a significant grey zone between legal and 
illegal business practices, particularly when it comes to payments made to reduce barriers to 
business or certain marketing strategies directed towards specific individuals. Documents 
describing international law and acceptable practices are available at the home pages of the 
above mentioned organisations.8  
 
It is common to distinguish between different types of corruption. Grand corruption refers to 
the bribery of politicians or bureaucrats with influence over large projects and important 
contracts. High level corruption is sometimes described as crony capitalism, in which political 
networks dominate important private assets, or state capture, in which private firms are able 
to influence public power to their own benefit (Hellman et al., 2000). Petty corruption is at 
the other end of the scale : small payments offered to or demanded from persons representing a 
lower level of an institution, such as local tax collectors, customs officers, health personnel or 
bureaucrats providing firms with the required licenses or permits. The relevant business term 
is facilitation payments, according to Transparency International, “a payment made to secure 
or expedite the performance of a routine or necessary action to which the payer of the 
facilitation payment has legal or other entitlement.”  
 
A firm bribes actively if offering a bribe where such payments are not requested, while 
passive bribery means accepting such demands; the difference between the two will often be 
unclear. The present study does not make much distinction, assuming that corruption for 
important business contracts generally is a result of shared understanding between the parts 
involved.9 Private-private corruption denotes the situation when one firm bribes a 
representative of another firm, neither of them representing a public institution. Judicial 
definitions of corruption will not always include the situations in which a public institution is 
not involved. The participants in this study do not seem to discriminate, finding corruption a 
challenge irrespective of whether the client is a public institution or a private firm. It is 
                                                 
7 Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 27.01.1999; OECD, Paris, 21.11.1997; and the United Nations, Merida, 
11.12.2003.  
8 Norwegian readers may also be interested in Dep. of Justice (2003), Harto (2003) and a study of the legal 
responsibility of companies’ boards (Grimstad, 2004). 
9 Although the issue of bargaining power is important in understanding corruption, as is well described by Rose-
Ackerman (1978), it is not a central research topic in this study. 
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important, therefore, to note that some of the business practices reported in this study may not 
be covered by international anti-corruption legislation.  
 
During some of the interviews the term corruption was itself a strain on the conversation. 
Terms sometimes preferred were undue business practices, predestination of contracts, bid 
rigging, silent digression from ethical rules, extralegal activities, inducement, low quality 
business climate, irregular trot, shabby business and feeling of connections. The use of such 
terms indicate a lack of exact knowledge about the business practices applied by other firms, 
and also a caution about describing practices, their own or those of competitors, by using 
terms that describe unquestionably criminal activities.  
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4  Experience of corruption  
Roughly one third of the respondents say they have seldom or never been confronted with 
problems related to corruption when operating in foreign areas: 26% say they have never had 
reason to believe that competitors have influenced tender procedures unduly. 17% have never 
and 43% have rarely experienced a gap between formal and informal rules when operating in 
areas where corruption is more common. 28% say that they are convinced that they have 
never lost a contract because of corruption.  
4.1 Lost opportunities  
Corruption is still disturbing the operations of many firms. The table shows the percentage 
responding positively, like frequently or often, to questions formulated in an unbiased way in 
the questionnaire, and who thus would agree to the statements in the second column.  
 
Table 4.1: Corruption and lost opportunities 
Statement Response  
B1 Unethical business practices are common 42% 
B2 A gap between formal and informal rules is frequently experienced 32% 
B6 We think we have lost a contract due to corruption  39% 
B6 We are convinced that we have lost a contract due to corruption 27% 
B5 Our firm has decided not to operate in a country mainly because of corruption or similar 
problems 
34% 
B3 Corruption impedes foreign direct investment (FDI) 11% 
Note: The first column refers to the number of the questions as presented in the  questionnaire, Appendix 1. Note 
also, the third and fourth question refer to the same problem. 
 
The number of firms that claim to have lost contracts due to corruption may appear high. 
Adding those who think and those who are convinced, two thirds of the respondents have lost 
business this way. The number is still not a reflection of real levels of corruption. The 
question asked in the survey is not restricted to a specific period of time: most of the firms 
have operated internationally for years, and many of them are large corporations with 
widespread operations. One contract lost due to corruption does not mean that this is a 
problem that happens all the time.  
  
The distinction between convinced and think was an attempt to reveal the “bad losers” in 
tenders from amongst those who really had lost contracts due to corruption. Several of the 
persons interviewed, however, based their assumption about lost contracts on situations where 
the firm had refused to meet a client ’s direct request for a bribe. When a competitor 
consequently won the contract, the respondents still might say that they think the competitor 
paid a bribe. They are not necessarily convinced despite such a clear indication.  
 
The extent of lost business reported in the present survey is comparable to the average result 
of the business survey mentioned, carried out by Control Risk Group during 2002. In the 
CRG study, 27% of the responding firms believed that they had lost business contracts 
because a competitor paid a bribe during the last year, almost 40% during the last five years. 
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The responses from the five countries included in the CRG survey differed significantly. 56% 
of Hong Kong firms claimed to have lost business due to corruption during the past 12 
months, compared to 16% of UK firms (CRG, 2002). 
 
The number of firms that have decided not to operate in a country mainly because of 
corruption or similar problems, 34%, is not particularly high if one assumes that problems 
relate to the business climate in general, and not only corruption. 11% of the firms find 
corruption to impede their FDI activities, apparently a small number. However, less than half 
the firms that have responded to the survey have FDI activities, only 23% outside the OECD 
region. One could, therefore, suspect that the 11% who find corruption to impede FDI 
activities represent about half the firms that have FDI activities outside the OECD region.  
4.2  Involvement  
Some of the firms are actually involved in corruption themselves, although few respondents 
admit this directly.  
4.2.1 Facilitation payments 
Facilitation payment is a form of corruption which has an unclear legal status to most of the 
participants, and which several respondents and interviewees justified.10 50% said that they 
never make “irregular payments to get things done”, 24% seldom do so, while 17% admitted 
that they sometimes or frequently make this kind of payment. The same question was asked 
by the World Bank in their World Business Environment Survey (Batra et al, 2003:53). They 
found facilitation payments to be requested most often in South Asia, South East Asian 
developing countries, and in Africa. Even so, almost half the firms operating in African 
countries said that they rarely or never had to make any irregular payments.  
 
Making respondents declare the true size of facilitation payments was not straightforward. 
Given alternatives in the questionnaire that were significantly lower than many “common 
(petty corruption) rates”, the survey asked for the size of such facilitation payments. 10% said 
that they typically paid less than NOK 1000, 20% less than NOK 10 000, while 9% typically 
paid between NOK 10 000 and 50 000. Just a very few firms (7%) admitted paying up to and 
above NOK 100 000 in “irregular additional payments to get things done”. Among the firms 
that admitted paying more than NOK 1000 in facilitation payments, 42% said that they did 
not have any problems respecting present regulations in this field. Batra et al. (2003) provide 
information about cross-country variations in the size of both facilitation payments and bribes 
to get contracts.  
4.2.2 Forced generosity 
The respondents were asked if it was necessary to offer valuable gifts or pay bribes to clients, 
directly or through an agent, to be able to operate in certain countries. Most of the respondents 
did not have sufficient information. There were also significant variations between sectors in 
this response (see Table 4.3). Nevertheless, 27% of the total found valuable gifts or bribes a 
prerequisite in certain regions. This number, even if substantial, appears to represent a 
                                                 
10 The examiners who conducted the mentioned OECD evaluation of Norway’s implementation of new anti-
bribery rules were concerned that information about facilitation payments was not sufficiently communicated to 
the business sector. This concern is justified by the present findings (OECD, 2004:28). The unclear legal status 
of facilitation payments and other forms of corruption is not always improved by the literature on business risks. 
Poole-Robb and Baily (2002:59) is just one example, asserting: “It appears that what is and is not a bribe is a 
matter of presentation and perception in much the same way as the concept of corruption itself”.  
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significant improvement compared to a PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) survey among the 
largest Norwegian firms in 1998. This survey found that 62% of the respondents considered it 
necessary to offer gifts to be able to operate in or get contracts in developing country markets.  
 
However, the indicated improvement of attitudes probably does not reflect a similar change in 
actual business practices. The PWC survey appears to reflect general attitudes in a year when 
international attention to corruption was still fairly low. The present survey, in contrast, aimed 
at the respondents’ own experiences. It also asked for their opinion in the post-Enron year of 
2004, after the implementation of the OECD anti-bribery convention and several information 
campaigns, just after a corruption scandal in a large Norwegian company, and during a time 
when corporate social responsibility was a main topic of debate. Moreover, it asked the 
respondents to mark the specific areas where they consider bribes a prerequisite “to be able to 
operate”. The regions mentioned most frequently were much the same as those pointed out by 
the respondents to the WB survey as particularly challenging and where corruption is a real 
business constraint (Batra et al., 2003: 51). Many firms still find themselves able to operate in 
the same areas without having to pay bribes, and we do not know how much effort firms that 
do pay bribes have put into alternative business practices.  
4.2.3 Corruption admitted 
The least reliable answers in the survey are most likely those where the respondents were 
asked directly about their own involvement in corruption. 9% admitted having accepted a 
request from an agent, an adviser or a consultant about money that would most likely be 
applied as bribery. Another 6% said that they probably have done so. 6% said that during the 
last decade they had tried to obtain a contract, a licence or a concession in a way that was 
important to keep confidential.  
 
When asked about the international extent of corruption in their own line of business,11 11% 
thought that it never happened, 46% thought that clients were influenced this way in “1-10% 
of the cases”; it was not made clear what “cases” refer to. 25% thought that corruption took 
place in “more than 10% of the cases”, a number that also includes 6% who thought that it 
happened in “more than 30% of the cases”. Only 19% said that they did not know. These 
responses do not indicate levels of corruption.  
4.3  Home country norms and activities abroad  
A study by Hellman et al. (2002), based on a dataset which is part of a World Bank business 
climate survey, clearly discloses the role of international firms, not as victims, but rather as 
being more active in bribery than their domestic counterparts. This study by Hellman et al. 
(2002) does not, however, describe the differences between firms from different countries 
with regard to their propensity to offer bribes. Do firms from countries perceived to be less 
corrupt have a lower propensity to make bribe payments? To what extent do Norwegian firms 
apply their home country norms when operating in foreign areas?  
  
Obviously, it is difficult to identify the “home country norms” of the firms responding to this 
survey. Most of them do not seem to consider corruption a considerable problem when 
operating inside of Scandinavia, a result that differs from polls covering Norwegian firms 
with less international experience. It has been claimed that corruption takes a different form in 
Scandinavia: that corruption is hidden in various forms of benefits other than bribe money. In 
the present survey, however, more than half the firms found the competition for important 
                                                 
11 Question E4 in the questionnaire, Appendix 1. 
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Scandinavian contracts to be free and fair. 20% found these procedures sometimes biased, 
while 11% found them often or always biased. About half the respondents thought corruption 
is never or seldom influencing the outcome of tender procedures in Norway, 30% thought it 
sometimes does so, and only 7% found it often to do so. 
 
According to Transparency International (TI), there is a clear difference between firms from 
different countries in their propensity to offer bribes in foreign markets. TI’s Bribe Payers 
Index (BPI) ranks the 21 leading exporting countries according to the tendency of their firms 
to pay bribes abroad. Sweden and Australia rank as the most ethical in this sense, while China 
and Russia are positioned as the most active in bribery. 12 Lambsdorff (2001), who links the 
level of corruption of import markets with bilateral trade statistics, also finds significant 
differences between exporters with regard to their tendency to offer bribes.  
 
In the present survey as many as 41% of the respondents said that there is no difference 
between firms from Scandinavian countries and firms from other OECD countries when it 
comes to bribery. The fact that firms from OECD countries are responsible for the majority of 
total worldwide cross-border commercial activity, i.e. standing for more than 70% of world 
trade in goods and services13, makes it relevant to search for distinctions between different 
OECD countries in their firms’ propensity to offer bribes. However, given the significant 
attention on corporate social responsibility in many OECD countries and the OECD 
convention on cross-border bribery, the differences between countries when it comes to their 
firms’ propensity to offer bribes, are more likely to be found between OECD-countries that 
have implemented the new rules and countries without this kind of restrictions.14   
 
When asked whether Scandinavian firms were more or less exposed, than firms from other 
countries (non-OECD countries included), to demands for bribes when operating 
internationally, 56% said that there is no difference. Compared to those who operate only with 
trade in international markets, firms with foreign direct investment appear more exposed to 
corruption and undue business practices. They are also more likely to adjust their practices to 
the local culture if corruption disturbs their business, irrespective of geographical area.15  
 
The present study finds the most apparent differences in attitudes and exposure to corruption 
to lie along the lines of industry and competitive pressure. The level of corruption in the home 
country of exporting firms may still denote the moral standards of business practices. 
Considering the increasing multinationality of big firms, it seems likely that the firms’ culture 
of origin becomes less important in this regard.  
4.4  Competitive pressure 
Several authors have suggested a positive correlation between firm profitability and bribe 
payments in developing countries (Myrdal, 1968; Ades and Di Tella, 1999; Kaufmann and 
                                                 
12 The fact that Sweden is among the countries most represented on the World Bank’s list of firms debarred from 
WB tenders due to bribery implies that we should be cautious in relying only on the BPI results.  
13 www.unctad.org 
14 Montigny (2004) describes the difference between firms from countries with restrictions on cross-border 
bribery and firms from other countries as a challenge and an obstacle to the development of industry and trade in 
African countries. Many “clean” firms prefer alternative markets in fear of being involved in corruption, and 
African countries are left with an “adverse selection” of foreign investors.  
15 In addition, these firms are less in doubt when asked questions related to corruption, i.e. they rarely respond 
with the “I do not know” alternative. This FDI-firm tendency is controlled for size, sector and turnover. 
However, the result does not imply that FDI activities are more exposed to corruption than trade.   
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Wei, 1999; Clarke and Xu, 2003). The correlation can be explained by two mechanisms. 
Profitable firms will typically have a larger willingness to bribe to reduce their cost of waiting 
for necessary services to be provided (speed money). Secondly, the person that receives a 
bribe may evaluate the “customer” and adapt the request for a bribe to observable information 
that indicates profitability, such as the firm’s size and industry. A study carried out by 
Svensson (2003) among Ugandan firms supports such a correlation; the more a firm can pay 
in bribes the more it actually has to pay. Svensson adds a nuance by observing that firms have 
to pay less if they have profitable alternative business options, for instance due to a low cost 
of reallocation or a low extent of sunk capital.  
 
The impact on the size of bribes demanded is, accordingly, a question of bargaining power, 
not just visible profitability. It is likely that bargaining power is also determined by other 
aspects.  Fiercer competition between firms may increase their propensity to take shortcuts, in 
the form of corruption, for instance. A correlation between competitive pressure and bribery 
can thus be consistent with results in respect of profitability and the size of bribes because the 
two aspects influence bargaining power between the firm and the corrupt official in two 
different ways.  
 
While intuition may support a link between competitive pressure and corruption, the 
correlation can be difficult to verify because bribes can be used to increase the market power 
of the briber. The present findings, however, still support such a correlation. Table 4.2 is a 
copy of Table 4.1 made to illustrate some variations in the reported exposure to corruption, 
across size and competitive pressure. 
 
 
Table 4.2 : Exposure to corruption, given differences in turnover and competitive pressure  
Turnover Competitive Pressure Question All respondents 
L M S Low  High 
Unethical business practices are common 42% 68% 31% 36% 37% 47% 
A gap between formal and informal rules is 
frequently experienced 
32% 58% 28% 20% 24% 38% 
We think we have lost a contract due to 
corruption  
39% 47% 42% 32% 22% 42% 
We are convinced that we have lost a contract 
due to corruption 
27% 37% 23% 24% 25% 31% 
Our firm has decided not to operate in a 
country mainly because of corruption or 
similar problems 
34% 42% 39% 25% 22% 42% 
Corruption impedes foreign direct investment 
(FDI) 
11% 26% 8% 6% 6% 16% 
Note: L, M and S refer to large, medium and small firms. High and low competitive pressure refer to the answers 
when asked whether prices for main products are reduced to a level that makes it hard to make profits. Note also 
that both the third and the fourth question refer to the same problem. 
 
 
Among firms exposed to competitive pressure (see Table 3.1), 42% say that they have 
decided not to operate in a specific country or region mainly because of corruption. Among 
these firms, 31% have decided not to operate in a specific sector or segment of the market 
mainly because of corruption. In the other category, the firms that do not feel the same 
pressure on prices, only 22% and 15% have made the same kinds of choice. In addition, two 
thirds of the respondents who consider bribery a necessity in certain regions operate in highly 
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competitive markets, whereas a third of these firms operate in markets where profits are more 
easily obtainable.  
 
It is difficult to tell whether this indicated correlation between pressure on prices and 
exposure to corruption is a real tendency or coincidence. If it holds for a larger number of 
firms, the result suggests that firms operating in competitive environments have a larger 
propensity to being involved in corruption, compared with firms with more market power.  
 
Given these results, it must be noted that indications of a correlation between corruption and 
competitive pressure cannot, of course, be read as a case against the reduction of trade barriers 
and efforts to improve competitive levels in developing country markets; quite the opposite. 
The strengthening of antitrust bodies should be a main issue of policy debate. Restrictions in 
competition and entry into strategic sectors can be enabled and continued by bribery. 
Corruption also enables collusion16 (Lambert and Sonin, 2003) and reduces the potential of 
markets to ensure a level of prices favourable to private welfare. Moreover, antitrust control is 
crucial to avoiding an adverse selection of foreign investors who aim at influencing laws and 
regulations with the help of state capture forms of corruption. Hellman et al. (2002) describe a 
pattern of variation in state capture tendencies of FDI firms between countries with and 
without good antitrust institutions.  
4.5 Size and sector 
The correlation between corruption and the size of firms is not clear. The WB study (Batra et 
al., 2003) finds that small (fewer than 50 employees), medium-sized or younger firms identify 
themselves as more constrained by corruption than larger (more than 500 employees) and 
older firms. Both the CRG survey (CRG, 2002) and the present study find larger firms to be 
more exposed to corruption compared to smaller firms (Table 4.1). Even so, the different 
results are not contradictory.  
 
The CRG and the present survey results are based on lost contracts and opportunities, 
referring to corruption at all levels. The WB survey makes a distinction between grand 
corruption and state capture ways of influencing laws and regulations on one side, and lower-
level corruption, bureaucratic red tape and facilitation payments on the other. The first type of 
corruption is, almost by definition, more common among multinational firms. Smaller firms 
are seldom capable of offering the amounts of money involved. The second category is 
probably a problem for both large and small firms. Still, small firms are more likely to be the 
victims of grand scale corruption and state capture, facing reduced transparency and 
predictability of laws and regulations.  
 
One explanation of the results in Table 4.1 is that larger firms typically get larger contracts, 
and that larger values are at stake for these firms. However, large firms will often have more 
experience and a larger spread in their international operations. Their probability of 
experiencing corruption will thus be larger per se, but not necessarily, if the probabilities 
compared are measured in the light of their total activities.  
                                                 
16 Corruption facilitates tacit collusion because it reduces the participants’ incentive to cheat. With an honest 
public official, cheating means offering a lower price than the cartel and thereby providing the firm with the 
short-term gain of winning the specific contract. When the public official is corrupt, on the other hand, the 
cheater commences a competition in bribes. The dishonest public official benefits, while the firm is not 
guaranteed the contract. This is why corruption will make tacit collusion and cartels more stable (Lambert and 
Sonin, 2003). 
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There is also a probable difference between active and passive bribery at this point. We know 
that large firms more often operate in markets where alternatives to active bribery are more 
common, such as political donations or political pressure. It is still not straightforwardly 
possible to assume that large firms are also more active in secret bribery. Large firms are 
more concerned about their reputation and seem to be more involved in anti-corruption 
efforts; they may also have alternative routes of influence that make them able to avoid 
demands for bribes requested at lower bureaucratic levels.17 Smaller firms may not take part 
in public tenders on large construction projects, contracts with a relatively high risk of 
corruption. Being part of a larger bid/tender is suggested by several of the firms in this 
category as being a common motivation for bribery. Smaller firms can thus be quite exposed 
to private-private corruption, either actively or passively.  
 
When it comes to variations in different sectors’ exposure to corruption, it is difficult to draw 
conclusions on the basis of this material. All sectors are not included in the survey, and those 
included are not represented in a number that corresponds to the actual distribution of 
exporting firms in Norway. Given these reservations, the sectors most exposed to corruption 
are construction combined with heavy industry and oil, gas and power transmission, followed 
by telecommunication & IT.   
 
Table 4.3 presents the responses to some questions related to firms’ frustrations because of 
corruption. The columns describe the percentages responding sometimes or frequently, as 
opposed to seldom or never. The columns presenting results on the two specific sectors, 
“construc tion and heavy industry” and “oil, gas and power transmission”, are the frequencies 
of these responses as a share of total response within each sector, i.e. holding sector as 
dependent variable.  
 
Table 4.3:  Different sectors, different exposure to corruption 
Percentage responding sometimes 
or frequently. 
Question  
All 
Constr. 
& heavy 
industry 
Oil, gas 
& 
power 
When competing in the areas mentioned*, do you ever have reason to 
believe that your competitors influence tender procedures unduly? 42% 57% 53% 
Has your company ever decided not to operate in a specific country or 
region mainly because of corruption or similar problems? 34% 37% 47% 
Have you ever experienced that unethical business practices have placed 
your company in a more adverse competitive position?** 67% 78% 76% 
When operating in foreign markets, do you ever have to make irregular 
“additional payments” to get things done? 17% 26% 29% 
Is it necessary to offer valuable gifts or pay a bribe to clients or public 
officials, directly or through an agent,  to be able to operate in certain 
countries?*** 
27% 40% 58% 
Note, * ”areas mentioned” refers to question B4 in the questionnaire. ** The reported response to this question 
is probably or for certain. ***This question also asks respondents to mark specific regions where this is the case.  
 
The sectors perceived to be most exposed to corruption according to the TI Bribe Payers 
Index, are “public works/construction”, “arms and defence” and “oil and gas”. 
                                                 
17 This may particularly be the case in countries where anti-corruption efforts are initiated at high political levels, 
e.g. Nigeria and Kenya.  
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Telecommunications and power generation/transmission are ranked number five and six. 
Heavy manufacturing and IT are ranked less corrupt by the TI respondents. Even if the TI 
ranking is based on a completely different question, the results are comparable with the 
findings in Table 4.3. The CRG study places the same sectors as being the more corrupt. 
However, according to the CRG study, “oil, gas and mining” were the most likely to give up 
an otherwise attractive investment because of corruption, and also the firms most likely to 
review their business practices on account of new laws in this field. Telecommunications 
firms were found to be the least likely to be deterred by corruption, and also the least likely to 
review their practices.  
4.6 Aid 
International aid to developing countries is sometimes mentioned as a field particularly 
exposed to corruption. Describing different perspectives, Alesina and Weder (2002) and 
Svensson (2000) conclude that under certain circumstances aid can increase the levels of 
corruption in the recipient country.  
 
A significant amount of international aid goes through private companies that carry out 
projects in developing countries. Donor governments will often tend to prefer national 
companies for operations financed by bilateral aid, thereby facilitating these firms’ entrance to 
the recipient country with industry and trade. There is thus a high probability that aid-related 
projects carried out by Norwegian firms also are financed by the Norwegian state.  
 
In their statistical study, Alesina and Weder (2002) find clear differences in the donors’ 
propensity to offer aid to corrupt governments. Australia and the Scandinavian countries were 
found to be among the most cautious about funding governments where aid is less likely to 
reach its intended purpose. Norwegian donors have been highly attentive to the problem of 
corruption for several years, and also made improvements in their procedures to reduce this 
risk. Even so, Scandinavian countries, Norway included, has provided aid for a long period of 
time to regimes that are perceived highly corrupt, such as Uganda and Tanzania, and a certain 
presence of corruption, in spite of anti-corruption efforts, is to be expected also in projects 
financed by Norwegian aid organisations.  
 
The risk of corruption is present at several stages of the procedures, during operations in the 
recipient country but also in the early choice of contractor for aid financed projects. The 
number of respondents with the relevant experience needed to provide information on the 
subject is not high in the present survey. Only 16 of the responding firms have actually carried 
out projects financed by multilateral or bilateral aid. However, half the firms with the relevant 
experience have the impression that corruption is more common in aid-funded projects than in 
non-aid projects. The other half found no difference between aid and non-aid projects. Only 
one respondent found aid activities to be “cleaner” than non-aid business ventures.  
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5 Tenders and corruption 
A specific contract is a typical objective of corruption in international business. The 
competition for the contract will often take place in the form of a tender. The tender procedure 
is supposed to follow explicit rules to ensure fair and “clean” competition between the 
bidders. We do not have much information about the efficiency of procurement rules to 
prevent corruption. Moreover, the distinction between acceptable business practices and 
corruption is often ambiguous in these situations. Firms competing for a contract will often try 
to influence the tender procedure, details in tender specifications or officials responsible for 
the contract. This kind of influence is not only conducted by firms. A considerable fraction of 
the respondents to this survey seems to consider political pressure a common aspect of 
international tenders.   
5.1 Influence on tenders 
5.1.1 Marketing strategies and technical consultation 
Marketing strategies challenge the definition of corruption when benefits of significant private 
value to the customer are offered, particularly when having a job-related aspect, such as 
business excursions and tickets to events to which job contacts are also invited. Several of the 
persons interviewed for the survey admit that the intention behind these gifts is similar or 
identical to the purpose behind bribery. Among the respondents, 26% offer valuable gifts to 
clients, while 36% offer excursions. These practices are clearly more common in sectors 
perceived to be among the more exposed to corruption.  
 
The survey aims to explore the meaning of “gifts” in this setting. During interviews it was 
made clear that the “gifts” or “bribes” requested can be very small, including in countries 
where the level of corruption is perceived to be high. In countries where gifts are often  
expected, it can be sufficient to offer small gifts at values far below what we would call 
bribery - “ridiculous items like cheap souvenirs or chocolate”, in the words of one 
interviewee. Firms that misinterpret a culture in this sense may offer gifts or bribes that are 
too valuable, thus encouraging corruption and disturbing the local business culture. However, 
the previously mentioned survey by PriceWaterhouseCoopers of Norwegian firms in 1998 
finds that gifts of rather small value create a bond between business partners that is able to 
influence contracts.   
 
Other ways of influencing clients are less direct. For instance, due to their high expertise, 
firms are often asked to advise clients on technical parts of tender specifications, even though 
they are among the competitors for the contract. This consultative service will also, in some 
cases, represent an opportunity to influence the specifications in a direction that benefits the 
firm itself or a firm that it co-operates with. Table 5.1 describes some of the survey findings 
on firms’ influence on tenders. The responses are reported for three groups, the total and two 
subgroups: those who generally found the international competition for important contracts in 
their industry free and unbiased (49% of the total) and those who sometimes or often found it 
predisposed and unfair (21% of the responses). About 31% of the respondents did not have a 
clear opinion about the extent to which the competition is biased.  
 
A majority of those who operate in markets where it is possible to influence tenders, where 
tenders are predestined, or where negotiations are common all through the tender procedure, 
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are also more likely to find the competition biased. The differences between the two sub-
groups in Table 5.1 are still not substantial, and the problems reflected by the questions asked 
are also common in sectors where the competition is perceived to be quite free and fair.  
 
 
Table 5.1: Influence on tenders  
Question asked Total Biased competition 
Unbiased 
competition 
n=never, s=seldom, f=frequently, o=often n/s f/o n/s f/o n/s f/o 
Are you ever able to influence or asked to advise clients on 
tender specifications? 
61% 33% 61% 39% 60% 40% 
Does it ever happen that tender specifications are designed to 
fit with the offer of one specific company? 45% 41% 50% 42% 63% 25% 
Will there often be negotiations between tender participants 
and decision-makers during the tender procedure?  
43% 49%* 37% 61% 47% 53% 
Dependent variable for sub-groups is total response. “Biased competition” refers to those who find the competition for 
important contracts predisposed and unfair, while “unbiased competition” refers to those who find it free and fair. *Almost a 
fifth of those reporting communication all through the tender claim that the communication is being copied to all tender 
participants.   
 
In addition to these results, 67% of the respondents find it essential or an obvious benefit to 
obtain or maintain a relationship to a potential customer prior to prequalification for a 
contract; only 24% find this unimportant. Out of those who operate in markets where it is hard 
to make profits, 14% do not consider early contact to be important. Among those who are able 
to make profits,  37% do not care about early contact.  
5.1.2 Early contact and predestination 
Contact at an early stage is often a prerequisite for participation in business. Firms that fail to 
make this kind of contact a part of their marketing strategies may find themselves unable to 
operate in some markets, and the contact in itself is not corruption. Early contact can actually 
represent an alternative to corruption. Personal relationships are considered important in many 
cultures, and may be more decisive for a customer than a bribe offered by a newcomer. Even 
so, early contact is also needed to establish the mutual trust necessary to make illegal corrupt 
deals on big contracts (Lambsdorff, 2002). A high reported impact of pre-tender contact may 
reflect biased tender procedures. It can still not be interpreted as a true indication of 
corruption.  
 
A more obvious sign of unfair competition is the high reported frequency of predestination, 
that contracts are designed to fit with the offer of one specific tenderer (Table 5.1, second 
question). The technical tender procedure may appear correct even if it covers some form of 
corruption. The qualifications required may be specified to fit with comparative advantages 
held only by the bribing company. The benefiting firm will thus offer the lowest price and  the 
formal procedures behind the choice of contractor can be justified.  
 
Predestination, or bid rigging, will often affect the choice of technology, a choice that 
typically has more consequences the larger the project. Andvig (1995) explains this problem 
and exemplifies by referring to the impact of choosing either a production ship or an oil 
platform, made out of either steel or concrete. In such cases, the choice directly affects what 
sub-contractors are to be used, and smaller firms have incentives to influence relevant 
decision-makers. However, predestination is not necessarily a result of corruption. Clients 
may be obligated to use tender procedures, regardless of strong preferences for a specific 
company, for instance because of satisfaction with its past performance. According to the 
persons interviewed, predestination is also applied to control the spread of contracts among 
few competitors and thus reduce their potential for collusion.  
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The problem of forged tender competition is, as expected, reported most frequently by firms 
that also consider the competition for important contracts unfair. Surprisingly, there is no 
difference between the different size categories and their perceived extent of predestination. 
Small and medium sized firms appear just as exposed to this problem as larger firms. The 
differences follow the business sectors. Predestination appears more common in 
telecommunications/IT, construction and oil, gas and power transmission (in that order), 
sectors that are also considered to be among the more exposed to corruption. 
5.2  Tender rules 
5.2.1 Do tender rules prevent corruption? 
Predestination and pre-tender contact make it reasonable to question the efficiency of tender 
rules in controlling corruption. As many as 55% of the respondents did not think that tender 
rules prevented corruption, 15% said that tender rules functioned as an obstacle, while only 
6% considered tender rules to be an efficient obstacle to corruption. The many possible ways 
of cheating on tender rules make it plausible that corruption does take place independently of 
such procedures (Della Porta and Vannucci, 1999).  
 
The present material does not enable a study of the correlations between the level of 
corruption, geographical location, and the use of formal tender procedures. The region 
reported as the one where tender procedures were most often neglected was still “East 
European countries and Central Asia”, a region where corruption was also perceived to be a 
significant problem. West and North European countries and USA/Canada are reported as the 
regions where tender procedures were most frequently respected.  
5.2.2 Rules of communication 
A problem that may enable corruption, seems to be that rules of communication often are 
neglected in tender procedures. While access to information and transparency are important in 
ensuring fair competition, it is crucial to keep critical information about the bids as secret as 
possible. Communication rules are supposed to prevent the distribution of such critical 
information, which for obvious reasons is a treasured object of bribery.  
 
A central element in most formal tender rules is the way the contact between client and 
bidders should take place once the tender process has started. At this stage, it is often required 
that communication between one firm and the client is copied to all tenderers. The results 
presented in Table 5.1 are not promising in this regard, revealing a high tendency to 
negotiating all stages of a tender, often without having critical information copied to other 
tender participants.  
 
The tendency to negotiate all through the tender is clearly more common among the largest 
firms. The contracts are larger and more complex at this level, and will often include details 
that need thorough discussion. These are, however, aspects that will also make it easier to 
cover up corruption. The violation of communication rules is, nevertheless, not categorically a 
result of corruption or a lack of respect for the rules among firms taking part in a tender. To 
hold down prices, or to make a certain firm win the tender, the client may have an incentive to 
inform one or several of the competing tenderers about the secret tender information. The 
information is sometimes presented in a way that makes the firm unable to prevent it being 
informed.  
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A significant number of the firms (44%) still expressed a general respect for this aspect of the 
tender rules. The people interviewed also appeared to regard the rules highly, and found it 
“very problematic” when the rules were not respected. Rules of communication are, by this 
group, held to be particularly important for complex contracts. A low respect for 
communication rules reduces the efficiency of tender rules to prevent corruption. 
5.3  Political pressure 
5.3.1  The bidder’s government 
The outcome of tenders on big contracts is sometimes affected by political pressure to the 
benefit of one specific firm, specifically when the client is another government. The pressure 
takes the form of a subsidy, such as export credit deals, aid to the buyer linked formally or 
informally to the purchase, diplomatic or political pressure,18 commercial pricing issues, 
impediments to trade or tied defence/arms deals.   
 
This kind of pressure is destructive, as it reduces the prospect of ending up with the outcome 
most beneficial to private welfare locally. The link to corruption becomes clear when the 
privileged firm has paid its own government to put pressure on the client.19 However, even 
without such a payment, it resembles corruption. The local welfare implication of such 
political influence is independent of an encouraging payment between the bidding foreign 
firm and its own government. Besides, the buyer is in effect bribed by the contractor’s 
government, while the responsible minister can “brag” about jobs and exports (without 
mentioning the fact that such jobs are in fact subsidised). Table 5.2 presents the results on this 
issue:  
 
Table 5.2: Political pressure and quid pro quo 
Question Total Biased   competition 
Unbiased 
competition 
n=never, s=sel dom, f=frequently, o=often n/s f/o n/s f/o n/s f/o 
Has any state institution from Norway ever taken part in the 
negotiations to ensure a contract, or to guarantee financial aspects?  
79% 19% 78% 22% 88% 13% 
Have you ever found that a competitor has won a contract with the 
help of political pressure?  
47% 32% 38% 49% 56% 31% 
When operating internationally, have you ever experienced a demand 
for a quid pro quo, such as the use of local human resources, the 
building of infrastructure or other contributions to the local 
community?  
68% 18% 67% 22% 73% 20% 
The two sub-groups, “biased” and “unbiased” competition, are categorised by the question “Do you perceive your industry to 
be free and unbiased when it comes to competition for international contracts?” 
  
While just 19% have had this kind of assistance from Norwegian governmental institutions, 
32% have found that competitors obtain contracts this way. This result is consistent with the 
TI Bribe Payers Survey, which finds significant differences in the propensity of governments 
to influence the international business ventures of domestic firms. Some of the interviewees 
for the present study mentioned the USA, France, the UK and Germany as the most active in 
this sense, a conclusion similar to TI’s. Several said that political pressure to the benefit of 
international competitors is a significant disadvantage and called for more political assistance 
from Norwegian authorities. Some also said, however, that Norwegian authorities tend to 
                                                 
18 For instance, in the form of political questions, such as “do you really wish to enter the European Union?” 
19 The pressure can also be a threat of political sanctions. According to people interviewed for this survey, it does 
happen in some countries that firms pay their national politicians, for instance in the form of party financing, to 
sanction a client, or the client’s government (when the client is a firm), after the contract has been given to “the 
wrong firm”, a competitor.  
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benefit Norwegian firms in governmental tenders and that foreign competitors probably 
consider this a comparable disadvantage.  
5.3.2  Quid pro quo  
Quid pro quo is often expected by local political authorities and refers to a reciprocal 
exchange as compensation from the firm for the benefit of being chosen as the contractor on a 
big project. It is not always clear what the content of this compensation should be. Many 
firms, particularly multinationals, offer various forms of local content during contract 
negotiations to show that they will operate with responsibility towards the local society, e.g. 
building a school or infrastructure, or the use of local human resources.  
 
It has sometimes been argued that social responsibility, or the inclusion of such local content, 
is a form of bribery, as it may induce a government to make a certain choice of bidder. About 
half the respondents to the survey conducted by Control Risk Group thought that companies 
made donations to charities now and then for the purpose of gaining a business advantage 
(CRG, 2002).  
 
However, it is legitimate to hope for an improved reputation in return for generosity. And 
local content will not necessarily influence the choice of bidder. The same local content can 
be expected from the chosen bidder, independently of which firm this is. Besides, a benefit to 
society is not supposed to profit privately a public official in charge of the contract 
procedures. While the development implications of local content in business contracts varies a 
great deal (Heum et al., 2003), it is important not to lump it together with the criminal act of 
bribery. Bray (2004) debates the issue of quid pro quo and, for firms that do not wish to have 
their charitable donations confused with bribery, he emphasises the importance of 
transparency in these transactions.  
 
The present study finds that only 18% frequently experience a request for quid pro quo, 33% 
seldom and 35% say they never meet such a request. Local content is far more common 
among the large firms compared to the small and middle sized, and appears – from this 
limited material - more common in construction and oil, gas and power transmission.  
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6 Strategic choices in the presence of corruption   
The presence of a challenging business climate may force a foreign company to make choices 
that it would not need to pay much attention to in a market where corruption is less common. 
This study explores some of these issues, such as the choice of strategy when competitors get 
contracts by offering bribes and the assistance from intermediaries and agents. In this setting, 
the study also explores the purposes of bribery: What are the actual benefits obtained?  
6.1 Actual and asserted business practices 
In general, judicial systems preserve existing values by making already accepted behaviour 
legal or unaccepted behaviour illegal. When it comes to corruption, it has not always been 
clear what the commonly accepted behaviour is (Bardhan, 1997). While the act of corruption 
has been illegal in most countries, cross-border bribery has been tax deduc tible under 
domestic regulations in many countries. Hence, there has been, and still is, a certain degree of 
acceptance of the bribery that goes on in countries with more corruption, according to 
corruption rankings, as well as among governmental institutions in developed regions.20  
 
New international rules have been vital to raise attention to and to criminalise this activity. 
Few utter pro-bribery points of view in public anymore. One consequence, however, is that 
the actual attitudes of firms have become more difficult to identify. It is not easy to tell 
whether firms act in respect of the law, or if they just pretend to do so.  
6.1.1 A problem caused by new rules?  
As a response to the new international awareness in the mid-1990s of the multinationals’ role 
in corruption, many firms found it necessary to demonstrate anti-corruption attitudes, 
particularly as the laws were upgraded in a number of countries. In addition, firms that had 
never been involved in corruption introduced codes of conduct to reduce employees’ 
propensity to offer or obtain bribes. As a result, firms without such codes appeared to be less 
trustworthy, and now all firms, independently of their actual conduct or geographical location, 
have incentives to promote themselves actively as being honest and responsible.  
 
The survey explores the firms’ obvious conflict of interest when operating in certain 
challenging business environments. Most firms wish to respect both local and international 
law, at the same time as they are worried about the consequences if single competitors pay 
bribes. The result might be a cynical gap between actual and asserted business practices. This 
gap is not induced by the new rules themselves, but rather by the lack of enforcement of the 
new rules. Internationally, there have been very few court cases based on the OECD 
convention of 1999 against cross-border bribery. Despite improved co-operation in 
international crime prevention, the probability of being caught is very small for firms 
involved in corruption. 21 
 
                                                 
20 One recent example is the Swedish Foreign Ministry’s refusal to sanction bribes for exports to Vietnam, 
claiming that “one sometimes has to pay bribes to do business in this country” (BBC Monitoring Service, 
11.03.2004). 
21 In this regard, the USA comes out as a bit more resolute than Europe. Cross-border bribery has been forbidden 
for US firms since 1977, when the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) was introduced. There have been a 
number of court cases in which firms have been heavily penalised. One recent example is ExxonMobil’s bribery 
of a Kazakhstan public official to get access to the country’s largest oil field.  
  30 
Table 6.1 presents the response to certain questions on corruption, and describes the results 
also for two sub-categories of respondent: those who never find it difficult to respect the law 
(33% of the total) and those who usually do not or sometimes find it difficult to respect the 
law (44% of the total). 22% were not familiar with the relevant regulation.  
 
Table 6.1:   Corruption and other undue business practices  
Question Total Easy to respect 
laws 
Not always easy 
n=never/no, s=seldom, f=frequently, o=often, y=yes n/s y/f  n/s y/f  n/s y/f  
Do you ever experience a gap between formal and informal rules in 
any of the areas just mentioned?   60% 32% 64% 32% 48% 52% 
When operating in foreign markets, do you ever have to pay some 
irregular “additional payments” to get things done?  
74% 17% 61% 26% 68% 29% 
Is it necessary to offer valuable gifts or pay a bribe to clients or 
public officials, directly or through an agent, to be able to operate 
in certain countries?  
66% 27% 78% 22% 68% 32% 
Has your own company ever accepted a request from an agent, an 
adviser or a consultant about money that would probably  be 
applied for bribery?  
76% 15% 81% 5% 65% 35% 
Has your own company, during the last decade, tried to obtain a 
contract, a licence or a concession in a way that is important to 
keep confidential? 
92% 6% 96% 4% 84% 13% 
Are you familiar with the OECD convention against the bribery of 
foreign public officials?  
70% 30% 65% 35% 52% 48% 
The dependent variable for the sub-groups is response within the sub-category. On the third question, “required to pay”,  
however, f/o represents those who responded by describing specific geographical regions, while n/s are those who did not 
know or did not respond. The dependent variable for the third question is thus also total response for the sub-categories.  
 
Those who sometimes find the laws difficult to respect are also those who are exposed to 
corruption or actively involved in it themselves. However, the group of firms that find it 
difficult to respect the law are also more familiar with the relevant legislation and the OECD 
anti-bribery convention. This result can be interpreted in at least two ways. Those who find 
the law easy to respect may not be fully aware of the legal status of corrupt practices. Or, 
firms that are more exposed to and frustrated by corruption are also more aware of new rules, 
still subject to a branch culture.  
6.2 Tolerance of corruption   
When respondents were asked directly, their outspoken acceptance of corruption was low. 
58% of the total found corruption to be never acceptable. 18% found it acceptable if there is 
no other way of operating in the market. Only 4% tolerated corruption if the contract was 
necessary to avoid insolvency, while two respondents defended corrupt practices if that was 
the way to get contracts.  
 
Even so, the general disapproval of the crime is challenged in the respondents’ daily business 
life. While a large share of the firms have lost contracts due to corruption (66%), only 5% 
would actively lodge an appeal to the customer or the tender authorities if encountering a 
competitor in bribery. 26% would get a formal explanation from the client under such 
circumstances. This is something they are supposed to receive, in any case, according to 
common tender rules, and cannot be considered an active response to corruption. If formal 
complaints are ignored or rejected, 13% would try to react in alternative ways - for instance, 
through political channels, in branch fairs or through journalists. As many as 45% say 
positively that they prefer not to react by any means under such circumstances. A majority of 
these firms agrees with the statement “corruption is part of the game”. Among the persons 
who claim that corruption is never acceptable, 35% prefer not to report or react against the 
practice.  
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These responses question the reported intolerance of corruption. Many respondents seem to 
consider corruption a fact of life, on which reactions will have no more than a marginal 
impact. This assumption is supported by the 65% who claim that they would have been more 
inclined to respond to bribery if it took place in a country where corruption is perceived to be 
uncommon.  
6.2.1 Reluctance to react  
What, exactly, explains the absence of responses to corruption? One of the excuses is that “we 
don’t want to make any fuss”. However, when competitors pay bribes, the companies lose not 
only their fair chance of gaining the contract, but also the investment of taking part in the 
tender, often a significant amount of time and, at least for the large firms, amounting to 
perhaps several million Euros. In spite of this significant loss, they do not want to make any 
fuss. 
 
A plausible explanation is the lack of proof. It is often impossible to verify that corruption has 
taken place. Section 4.1 also describes a general reluctance to accuse somebody of being 
“corrupt” without clear evidence. However, firms that have participated in a tender where the 
outcome has probably been affected by corruption will often have reason to be sure about 
their suspicion. They may have been asked for bribes themselves, they pick up reliable 
rumours, or by other means they realise that the tender procedure is flawed.  
 
To explore the reasons why firms prefer not to react when realising that a competitor has paid 
bribes, the respondents were asked to rank alternative explanations. The result is presented in 
Table 6.2. Lack of proof and concern about sanctions from the firms reacted against are 
unexpectedly low. The most important reason for staying silent is worry about future business 
co-operation. Accordingly, if firm A loses business because firm B paid a bribe, it prefers not 
to react against the practice out of concern for future business cooperation with firm C, or 
even B.  
 
Table 6.2: Absence of reaction  
Question  Answers  % 
Concern about sanctions from the bribing company 5% 
Concern about sanctions from other companies 5% 
Concern about future business cooperation 31% 
Concern about sanctions from customers 18% 
Lack of knowledge about the illegality of the act 15% 
Lack of proof 12% 
Other reasons 0% 
Independently of the experiences of 
your own business unit, what do you 
think is the most common reason for a 
company to keep quiet when 
encountering a competitor in bribery? 
I do not know 5% 
Note: The respondents were asked to rank the explanations suggested in the questionnaire. This table describes 
the total score based on a summary of the alternatives, ranked as number one and number two. 
 
More surprisingly, the firms that never co-operated with other firms were just as concerned 
about losing future business cooperation in this way as those that did occasionally have this 
kind of co-operation. 22 This worry was somewhat higher among firms able to make profits. 
The firms that operated under higher competitive pressure on prices were more worried about 
sanctions from the client in question than about lost business co-operation with other firms.  
 
                                                 
22 One explanation is the formulation of the question, as it encourages distance from the practices of one’s own 
business unit. However, the high number of firms that claimed to have lost contracts due to corruption makes it 
reasonable to assume that most answers were based on the firms’ own experiences. 
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The worry about losing future business co-operation can be explained by theories on 
collusion, loyalty to other firms in the business culture or worries about sanctions that would 
not necessarily apply (Søreide, 2005). 
6.3 Adjustment to local business practices 
Given the results from the previous section, that raising one’s voice is seldom considered, 
firms are left with two options when operating in challenging business environments: exit 
from the market or adjust to local business practices. About half the respondents, 52%, say 
that they would adjust to the local business culture if losing contracts due to corruption and/or 
would accept corruption as “a part of the game”. Table 6.3 describes the responses in detail. 
 
Table 6.3: Corruption as an obstacle to business  
Question  Answers  % 
No big reaction, corruption is part of the game 28% 
We adjust our strategies to the local business culture 24% 
We retreat from the country 5% 
We report the case in alternative ways 13% 
If you generally choose not to 
complain [on bribery], or if 
complaints are ignored or 
rejected, what do you typically do? 
I do not know 28% 
 
Taking part in corruption is frequently suggested as an interpretation when business people 
are asked how the answer, adjust to local practice, should be understood. This is still 
speculation, and the responses in Table 6.3 also reflect other ways of behaving and doing 
business. For instance, local practice can also reflect the ways international firms pick up 
local firms’ habits of applying “men of influence” to getting through to important clients or 
politicians.  
6.3.1 Agents, intermediaries, contacts, advisers  
It is both legitimate and reasonable that many firms find it necessary to enter foreign markets 
with the assistance of local advisers. To get more information about the kind of advice 
preferred by Norwegian firms, the study explores the categories of adviser that are most 
frequently applied. Table 6.4 presents the answers.  
 
 
Table 6.4: Local assistance 
Question Answers % 
Agents and advisers with ties to relevant decision-makers 32% 
Bureaucrats and/or politicians 5% 
International business advisers and/or country analysts 9% 
Relatives of people in governmental institutions 1% 
Lawyers with the relevant competence 6% 
Agents able to deal with local formalities 32% 
Local business advisers without ties to the government  7% 
What kind of assistance is typically 
preferred by your company when 
entering foreign markets? 
I do not know 8% 
Note: Table 6.4 is a summary of the responses ranked most frequently as number one, two and three.  
 
However, the respondents were asked to rank alternative answers, and Table 6.4 summarises 
the alternatives marked most frequently as number one, two and three. What it then fails to 
give information about is the categories of local assistance that were most frequently ranked 
number one. Considering this response, the firms were clearly most interested in ties to 
relevant decision-makers. Almost 50% of the respondents ranked this alternative number one, 
while clearly avoiding the relatives of persons in high-ranking positions. Agents able to deal 
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with local formalities were also much requested. This alternative was still ranked number one 
by only 12% of the respondents.  
 
In addition to the Table 6.4 information, 44% of the responding firms said that they had 
contacts positioned at, or with access to, a high level of the government in countries where 
they operated. 12% of those who had high- level political contact did so in all their countries 
of operation, 17% in countries with a less familiar culture and 17% only in Norway or other 
countries inside the OECD area.  
6.3.2 Middlemen and corruption 
It is certain that intermediaries, agents, consultants and joint venture partners sometimes are 
used to get around anti-corruption laws.23 This is uncovered in surveys and also in cases that 
are brought to court and to media attention. Making use of the benefits provided by agents 
with access to key decision-makers is still no verification of corruption. Basu (2000:161) 
describes an equilibrium where bureaucrats have incentives to comply with the wishes of “a 
man of influence”. In this model the key decision-makers are not “meticulously ethical” in 
their decisions, yet do not request any bribes. Their helpfulness is simply based on an 
indefinite hope of fruitful benefits in return, from having contact with such a man of 
influence. The equilibrium, where key decision-makers prefer to serve the influential person, 
is stable, but still totally dependent on the reputation of the man of influence - of his 
remaining a man of influence. A debate about the ethical aspects of making use of the 
reputation of such persons, and hence successful agents, is timely, although perhaps still 
obstructed by its clear connection to the criminal act of corruption.   
 
The importance of ties to decision-makers is usually justified by referring to cultural 
differences in the ways of doing business. As part of globalisation, however, the ways of 
doing business are being standardised. Work towards a standardised WTO government 
procurement agreement is progressing, the EU has recently introduced new tender rules, and 
standardised bidding procedures are already widely applied, including in developing 
countries. Firms have a responsibility to expect content behind these procedures, and not just 
assume that personal ties are what really matters during the procedure. As long as firms do not 
recognise this responsibility, the emphasis on agents and ties will continue. And certainly, the 
more emphasis there is on ties to decision-makers, the stronger the suspicion is that firms are 
involved in corruption and the less reason there is to expect free and fair competition.  
6.3.3 Middleman compensation  
Compensation to agents is usually a pre-agreed percentage share of the total contract, and 
offered as a success fee where payment depends on the tender outcome. About half of those 
who offer compensation to agents said that they typically offer 1-5% of the total contract 
amount, a quarter offer 6-10% in compensation, a few firms offer 11-15%, while just 2 
respondents said that they offer more than 15%. The percentage usually offered in 
compensation did not differ significantly between firms of different size. Payments above 6% 
of the contract were still more common among smaller firms. More visible differences 
occurred between sectors. For instance, the percentages offered appear, in this survey, to be 
significantly higher within “Telecoms and IT” compared to, for instance, “oil, gas and power 
transmission”. If, as a speculation, the payments reflected bribery, the result does not match 
Transparency International’s ranking of sectors according to their perceived level of 
corruption. Both telecommunications and IT compare favourably to oil and gas in TI’s Bribe 
                                                 
23 Bray (2004) describes the different risks of taking part in corruption through the use of intermediaries, and 
finds the hazard to be increased, due to the improvement of international anti-corruption legislation.  
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Payers Survey. However, the difference is also likely to reflect differences in the sizes of the 
contracts in the two mentioned categories of firms, and the different proportions between 
production costs and revenues.   
6.4  Motivation behind bribery  
In the search for a better understanding of bribery, the survey aims to gather information 
about the purposes behind corruption, as well as the underlying motivation behind the crime. 
Increasing sales is obviously the main motivating factor for the choice of any business 
strategy, corruption included. Given this main driving force, there are still variations in what 
firms seek to achieve with the help of bribery. 
6.4.1 The purpose of bribes 
Table 6.5 presents the most common aims behind the use of bribes, as suggested by the 
respondents. The questionnaire does not ask about the respondents’ own motivation, but 
rather that of other companies in their line of business. The present data should therefore not 
be applied as a basis for general conclusions about the respondents. The table still illustrates a 
potential for collecting more nuanced information on this issue.  
 
 
Table 6.5:  The purpose of bribes 
Question raised Answers  % 
Adjustments in tender specifications 14% 
Being part of a bid for a larger contract or concession 7% 
Improve economic conditions, such as tax reductions 5% 
Obtain the contract through direct negotiations 26% 
Secret information about evaluation or tender specifications 19% 
Secret information about the other companies’ bids 15% 
Promises of neglected quality controls  1% 
Reduced political risk  1% 
Other benefits  0 
If companies in your line 
of business operate unduly, 
for instance by 
establishing secret ties to 
specific decision-makers, 
what would you suggest 
that they typically would 
be aiming at?  
I do not know 14% 
Note: The table is a summary of the responses most frequently ranked number 1, 2 or 3.  
 
Individuals in a public institution or a large firm will not usually have the necessary authority 
to just “give away” contracts. Bribers will therefore have to apply less direct ways to 
influencing the choice of contractor, probably less expensive ways, as a direct guarantee of 
the contract is not obtainable. The “price” is reduced when the offer is less attractive. Many of 
the respondents consequently suggest secret information about evaluation criteria or tender 
specifications to be a common purpose of bribery. The firms offer bribes to obtain a tender 
advantage vis-à-vis competitors, not necessarily to obtain a direct promise of the contract.  
 
In many cases, the benefits offered and gained seem too small to be considered “real bribery”, 
and might also be applied by firms that consider themselves “clean” and not involved in 
corruption. The drawback, from a welfare perspective, is that relatively small benefits or gifts 
can have a significant private value to the public officials in question, particularly in countries 
where the level of income generally is low. “Soft influence”, more like marketing than 
bribery, can consequently have a decisive impact on the client’s choice of contractor.  
 
Contrary to respecting tender rules, the respondents suggested that bribes are most often paid 
to obtain the contract through direct negotiations, which means the abandonment of tender 
procedures altogether. Common justifications for direct negotiations are the familiarity of 
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operators with similar equipment, the uniformity of spare parts, a preference for previous 
suppliers, or the fact that a tender procedure was too expensive or time consuming. While 
these justifications can be legitimate, they may also enable corruption. One third of the firms 
ranked direct negotiations as the most important intention behind bribery, perhaps a 
disappointing result if hoping for standardised tender rules. However, the result also 
underscores the importance of tender rules for reducing corruption. There is no logic in 
offering bribes to avo id tender procedures if these rules are not applied.  
6.4.2 Underlying motivation 
The respondents were asked to suggest the most important underlying motivation for 
companies in their line of business to offer bribes. The survey question is based on Moody-
Stuart’s (1997:21) explanation of why companies pay bribes. The respondents were given 
three alternatives, all connected with securing sales, still excluding the obvious goal of getting 
a contract. Table 6.6 presents the distribution of responses. 
 
 
Table 6.6: The underlying motivation behind bribery 
Alternatives % 
1. The fear of losing contracts because someone else has bribed the decision-makers 43% 
2. Because the goods or services offered would not have been chosen in a fair competition 21% 
3. To persuade decision-makers to buy goods or services that otherwise would not have been demanded 5% 
4. I do not know 31% 
 
The third alternative motivation behind bribery, persuading decision-makers to buy goods or 
services which they basically do not need, had a surprisingly low rate of response. However, a 
certain bias against this alternative should be anticipated in such a survey, as most producers 
have a strong belief in their own products. We cannot expect salespersons to believe their 
products are not needed. Besides, these kinds of goods are typically expensive and 
technologically advanced. Moody-Stuart (1997) suggests military hardware to be the classic 
example of this kind of corruption. There are, however, no arms/defence producers among the 
respondents to this survey.   
 
The second alternative, that the goods would not have been chosen in a fair competition, 
refers to products or services that do not have the required or standard quality, or products that 
are over-priced. The buyer demands compensation, a bribe, for choosing the specific product, 
as better alternatives exist. This motivation is probably quite common, but still suggested by 
only 21%.  
 
The alternative suggested most, by more than half of those who had a view, was the worry 
about losing contracts simply because someone else have bribed the decision-makers. The 
great majority of bribers are probably motivated by a lack of trust in their competitors. This 
result reveals a considerable information problem, but also a challenge when it comes to the 
firms’ internal control and measures against corruption.  
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7  Internal control and measures  
Many firms place significant efforts on issues related to corporate social responsibility. Even 
so, the introduction of anti-corruption codes in many large firms has not so far had any 
convincing impact on the extent of corruption in international markets. One reason is perhaps 
that many firms that operate in international markets are not prevented from taking part in 
unethical business practices by codes of conduct or home-country regulations. Other firms 
may continue to pay bribes, in spite of their anti-corruption codes, in fear of losing contracts 
because competitors pay bribes. It is, therefore, interesting to explore the respondents’ internal 
anti-corruption measures, their expected impact on the firm, and their view on responsibility if 
a case of corruption is coming up.  
7.1 Codes of conduct and routines to detect corruption 
Anti-corruption measures introduced in the firms vary significantly. 89% of the large firms 
have internal written codes of conduct that restrict employees from paying bribes, compared 
to only 19% of the small firms. Altogether, 36% of the total have such codes. Even so, as 
many as 48% claimed to have routines to detect violations of anti-corruption codes. There are, 
accordingly, more firms with routines to detect bribery carried out by employees than there 
are firms with written codes of conduct introduced to control the crime. This is not necessarily 
inconsistent. Most firms find it necessary to have control routines to detect a variety of 
misdeeds, corruption included. The number of firms which find that they need to introduce 
codes of conduct on corruption is most likely fewer.  
 
Only 21% of the total found their routines to detect corruption to be efficient. However, the 
fact that as many as 74% claimed to have efficient routines to detect false consultancy fees, 
fake invoices or illegal transactions made, for instance, to avoid taxes makes it plausible to 
assume that firms’ control mechanisms are less able to detect bribery than other forms of 
economic crime. Several of the interviewees also called for more information about how to 
introduce control mechanisms on crimes related to corruption. When it came to the detection 
of their own employees in receiving bribes, 30% said they have relevant control routines. 
When asked if they actually had detected an employee in corruption, 13% said that they had.  
 
Almost half the firms (47%) encouraged employees to report the case internally if they 
uncovered bribery or other types of crime carried out by the firm. Only 11% did not 
encourage employees to do so, whereas 35% said that they did not actively encourage 
employees to make a report. Many of these firms would probably still expect their emp loyees 
to report such cases if they were taking place.  
 
During the past decade, NHO, the business organisation, has arranged several anti-corruption 
conferences and informed their members about the problem of corruption and the importance 
of keeping to professional standards of conduct. As most of the firms are members of this 
business organisation, it is relevant to ask about the impact of these campaigns. Table 7.1 
presents the responses.  
 
While 35% already had a clear attitude against bribery, 26% find the campaigns to have 
influenced their views.  
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Table 7.1 The impact of NHO’s anti-corruption campaigns  
Question  Answers % 
No 9% 
No, we already had a clear attitude against bribery 35% 
Yes, it has influenced our attitude to some extent 11% 
Yes, it has clearly altered our attitude  15% 
I am not familiar with their campaigns 10% 
Do you think anti-
corruption efforts made by 
your own business 
organization have 
influenced the attitudes 
against bribery in your 
company? I do not know 19% 
 
A significant ambition of the NHO campaigns was to inform firms about the implementation 
of the OECD anti-bribery convention, and the subsequent implications for the firms’ business 
practices. Although the questionnaire reminded the respondents about its content, as many as 
70% of the respondents still did not find themselves familiar with the convention. This 
number is surprisingly large, especially as such a considerable share of the respondents 
claimed to be aware of NHO’s distribution of anti-corruption information. Even so, 26% said 
that employees in relevant positions are informed by the company of the content of the OECD 
convention. These firms were mainly large.  
7.2  Company culture 
Differences between firms in their business ethics are not found by just considering their anti-
corruption commitment. For instance, among firms with an anti-corruption code, 31% 
admitted that they would adjust their strategies to the local business culture if losing contracts 
because of corruption. There is still reason to assume that anti-corruption codes of conduct 
will have some influence on the company culture and thus a firm’s actual performance. Most 
business leaders would hesitate to introduce rules that no one is expected to follow.  
 
When asked about the major reason for not paying bribes when operating in foreign markets, 
one of the most frequent answers was “it is not part of our company culture”.24 Hence, 
implementing anti-corruption best practice is likely to have some impact on a firm’s tendency 
to be involved in bribery in situations where a bribe otherwise would not have been requested. 
Codes may also reduce the demands for bribes as it becomes easier for representatives of the 
firm to reject such requests, and future expectations about bribes will be reduced. Is it likely 
that codes are also able to reduce the firm’s potential for losing contracts, due to corruption?  
 
The CRG study finds that firms from countries where anti-corruption codes are common, the 
USA and the UK, are less exposed to corruption in the sense that these firms report a lower 
tendency to lose contracts because competitors pay bribes. However, the present survey does 
not find any lower exposure to corruption among those with best practice codes. There are in 
fact significantly more losses of contracts reported due to corruption in the group of firms that 
have implemented anti-corruption codes, compared to the category without such codes. 
Norwegian firms that have introduced best practice codes are probably also those that are 
most exposed to such problems. Moreover, respecting codes of conduct in such a setting is 
likely to increase a firm’s propensity to lose contracts due to corruption, because it does not 
take part in bribery. 25 This perhaps obvious implication is often neglected in anti-corruption 
debates.  
                                                 
24 The other most frequent responses were “it is illegal”, “it is immoral”, and “it may harm our reputation”.  
25 However, the situation is familiar to firms exporting from the USA. While their European competitors could 
get tax deductions because of bribery, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act has prevented US firms from paying 
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7.3 Information, responsibility and the case of scandal  
Top executives are, in addition to the board, officially responsible for a firm’s operations. It is 
reasonable to assume that decisions about bribery are made at the same level. When CRG 
(2002) explored which sections of a company were most likely to be involved when bribery 
does take place, the most common response was “senior management”. In the present study, 
most respondents represented “senior management”, and most of them said that they would 
have been informed if bribery had taken place on behalf of the firm. More than half, 55%, 
would certainly have been informed, and 29% would probably have been informed, if bribery 
had taken place to obtain a contract or a significant benefit.  
 
Some of the respondents still admitted that it might be difficult to control how agents in fact 
spent their payment. Almost one third (29%) did not think they would be able to discover 
whether a considerable part of the compensation to an agent was applied for bribery, 
compared to 54% who positively thought it would be possible to notice this.  
 
Only 16% said that they would not know if the firm took part in corruption. This response 
may reflect the fact that several respondents were in charge of just a branch of a multinational 
firm, and thus unable to be responsible for the operations of other divisions. In addition, some 
firms have employees in positions that may provide them with incentives to pay bribes out of 
their private pocket to increase their chance of doing business, and hence their personal career 
opportunities. The bribe in such cases is still paid on behalf of the firm.26 
 
Previously, there seemed to be a tendency among executives to avoid unpleasant information 
about “grease” payments and bribery taking place in foreign countries of operation. This 
tendency is not very observable in the present material. Just 18% had actually considered it a 
benefit not to be informed if an agent applies his compensation to questionable payments, 
compared to 70% who would never consider this a benefit.  
 
Cases of corruption can cause vast reputational damage, and it is obvious that most firms that 
happen to face a corruption scandal are cautious about publicity. When asked about the 
typical reaction from the company if a serious violation of ethical codes, such as corruption, 
were detected, the responses were as follows: 42% would initiate an internal inquiry, while 
13% would have an internal discussion. Only 11% thought they would involve the police, and 
just one firm would open the way for investigation by an external committee or consultancy. 
The survey question is, however, difficult to answer. The firms’ reactions would obviously 
depend on the actual circumstances, and 32% said that they in fact did not know how they 
would react. The tendency in this material, including the interviews, still reveals a significant 
anxiety about discussing the problem with persons outside the firm. 
 
Conclusively, when there is a deviation between actual and asserted business practice, the 
accountability appears to lie both formally and actually in the hands of those who typically 
introduce, or accept the introduction of, anti-corruption codes of conduct. The risk of 
corruption is, therefore, mainly connected to the probability of being caught out in corrupt 
practice. Firms that carry out projects as a joint venture or a consortium, face the additional 
risk of having cooperating firms influencing clients in unethical manners. 42% of the firms 
                                                                                                                                                        
bribes in foreign countries since 1977. This competitive disadvantage made the US authorities actively 
encourage the introduction of an OECD anti-bribery convention.  
26 The unclear liability of the firm in such situations should not be a loophole in laws against corruption. Too 
many firms have escaped prosecution by placing the guilt on a scapegoat. In Norway, for instance, only 
individuals had, until recently, been held responsible for the offence of bribery.  
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said that they have carried out projects in a foreign country as a joint venture or as a part of a 
consortium. One third of these firms said that they have actually experienced the problem of 
having a cooperating firm influencing a client in a way that the respondent found difficult to 
acknowledge. Most of these firms uttered a reaction against the specific practice.27  
7.4 Changes in the level of corruption 
While most of the respondents found corruption to be on the decrease, as many as 73% said 
that their own attitude to corruption had remained unchanged. Many firms have of course held 
a clear anti-corruption stance for a long time. However, several respondents described 
significant corruption during the late 1990s. A more frequently reported perception of change 
after the introduction of new regulations on cross-border bribery was therefore anticipated. 
Among some 16% who actually had changed their attitude to corruption, only one respondent 
found corruption to be more accepted now than previously. When asked about the time of 
change, there was no clear link to the implementation of the OECD convention, or to specific 
corruption scandals reported in the Norwegian press.  
 
The common perception of less corruption may represent a reality. Considered in light of 
some other results, however, they do appear optimistic. For instance, a clear majority of the 
CRG respondents thought that corruption would either increase or remain unchanged in 
coming years (CRG, 2002). In the present study, 43% did not consider the competition for 
important contracts in their industry to have become more fair and unbiased during recent 
years. Only 27% found the competition in international markets to be improved in this sense.  
 
The competition for important contracts is influenced by several means other than corruption. 
Nevertheless, as corruption is hidden activity, and one explanation why the competition is 
unfair, it is surprising that firms are able to find the levels of corruption reduced, while the 
competition for important contracts continues to be unfair.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 However, some firms may carry the concept of due dilligence a bit too far. Some of the respondents said that 
illegal methods, similar to the practices of intelligence services, are applied by firms in international markets to 
be assured that potential business partners will not operate in a way that may represent a risk to the firm.  
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8 Concluding remarks  
If not answers, the project has provided new information related to the research questions 
described in the introduction. Even if the generality of the results is limited, the study may be 
useful in the way it informs about mechanisms and preferences, supports some hypotheses in 
the literature and describes the potential for more specific business surveys on corruption.  
 
The results of the survey of Norwegian embassies describe a grave picture of corruption as a 
business constraint on foreign firms and a challenge difficult to overcome, also for Norwegian 
firms. A deviation between firms’ actual and publicly asserted business practices is noticeable 
to the embassy respondents, and many of them assume that a refusal to make irregular 
payments will reduce the opportunities of foreign firms to do business. Even so, most of them 
would not advise Norwegian firms to take part in corruption or adopt undue business 
practices. The embassies’ willingness to assist firms in raising specific cases of corruption at 
higher political levels appears strong.  
 
The results of the business survey are both reassuring and alarming. A clear majority said that 
corruption was totally unacceptable, and all the respondents were able to say why it is wrong 
to pay bribes. Most of the firms still claimed to have lost an important contract because a 
competitor paid a bribe. The barrier to taking action against the practice in such a situation is 
still surprisingly high. The absolute majority preferred to stay silent if competitors paid bribes. 
Lack of proof is a reasonable explanation. However, the more common reason was, 
reportedly, a concern about future business cooperation.  
 
Corruption was described as “part of the game” by a large share of the respondents, a 
problematic exogenous factor that one has to be aware of when operating in certain markets. 
Generally, the firms’ strategies seemed to vary across different business cultures. The 
respondents had, for instance, a significantly higher propensity to act on corruption if it took 
place in a country where the problem was uncommon. A large share of the firms would 
“adjust their practices” to the local business culture if losing contracts due to corruption, while 
just one out of twenty had retreated, or would have retreated, from the country if being in this 
specific situation. Home country norms may still prevent firms from entering certain markets; 
almost one third of the respondents had decided not to operate in a market because of a 
difficult business climate. Once established in a new market, however, most firms seemed to 
apply local norms. This will not necessarily imply corruption.  
 
Most respondents did not consider corruption a significant problem when operating in 
Norway. Going abroad, however, Norwegian firms did not seem less exposed to corruption 
than their competitors. Differences in branch culture and industrial structure appear more 
important in characterising a firm’s exposure to this problem than company size and culture 
of origin. Firms that operate under competitive pressure seemed to have a larger propensity 
towards being involved in corruption compared to those with more market power. The result 
is interesting as it deviates from conclusions in previous studies.  
 
Many respondents revealed some confusion about the legal status of certain forms of 
corruption. Several respondents said that they apply business practices that clearly violated 
Norwegian law, while claiming that it was easy to respect existing regulations in the field. 
While 70% were not familiar with the OECD anti-bribery convention, which is incorporated 
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into Norwegian law, just 15% found themselves not to be familiar with the relevant 
Norwegian legislation. However, firms that admitted being unable to respect the law in certain 
situations were also the most informed about the OECD anti-bribery convention. Similarly, 
there were significantly more losses of contracts due to corruption in the group of firms that 
had implemented anti-corruption codes, compared to the category without such codes.  
 
Top executives are informed and responsible, not only formally, if corruption does take place.  
New rules and a focus on the problem have probably reduced the number of employees 
informed if a firm is involved in bribery. Also CRG (2002) finds a significant change at this 
point. It seems that the most common objective in the bribery of clients is to increase the 
briber’s probability of obtaining a contract. Given some regard of tender rules, direct access to 
a contract may appear less obtainable  or too risky. However, tender procedures are not held to 
be an efficient obstacle to corruption. Avoiding such procedures is still a main purpose of 
bribery. Bid rigging and forged tender procedures appear to be serious problems in 
international business, to which the small firms in the present survey are no less exposed than 
the large firms. Political pressure is reportedly a disturbing element in large international 
tenders, described as an alternative to corruption, or as a form of corruption.      
 
The underlying driving force behind corruption is the worry about having competitors 
offering bribes. As a logic consequence of this result, anti-corruption responsibility by firms 
involves a signal of reliable anti-corruption commitment. One option can perhaps be found in 
compensation programs, where all managers lose bonus in case of corruption. Another 
alternative is to blow the whistle when detecting competitors in bribery.  
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Appendix 1: The business survey questionnaire 
Corruption Survey                                           
 
This is a survey on corruption in international business transactions. It is carried out by CMI researcher Tina 
Søreide in cooperation with NHO. The study is part of a PhD. project at the Norwegian School of Economics 
and Business Administration (NHH) and financed by The Norwegian Research Council (NFR).  
 
Corruption, or similar ways of making influence on decision-makers, is a challenge for those who want to enter 
or operate in certain markets. The objective of this survey is to examine some aspects of the problem, and 
particularly how Norwegian firms encounter unethical business practices when operating in foreign areas. The 
data collected will be applied for research purposes.  The information obtained will be treated strictly 
anonymously and confidentially. Neither your name nor the name of your company will be mentioned in any 
documents related to this study.  
 
The survey focuses on corruption and similar undue business practices related to the assignment of important 
contracts; generous bribes, gifts or benefits offered typically to influence the tender procedure or the outcome of 
negotiations. More explanations to terms in use, the underlined terms, can be found on the last page. If you 
would like to add any comments related to your responses, or on the topic in general, we encourage you to do so 
on the last page. Any questions can be directed to Tina Søreide at CMI or Jon Vea at NHO.*  
    
Questionnaire       
General information                                                                                                                                           
A1 
 
What is your position in the company?  
 
 
 
Please indicate your field of responsibility 
 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
 
A2 
 
Where is your headquarter localized?  
 
 
 
Circle the answer that applies the most 
Norway 
Other Scandinavian country 
Other European country 
USA/Canada 
Outside the areas mentioned 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
A3 Ownership 
 
 
 
 
 
                            Size of state ownership:     ----------------% 
     
                            Nationality of leading owner:    
   
                            ---------------------------------------------- 
 
A4 Annual turnover worldwide for your company 
 
 
 
>1 billion NOK 
100-1000 million NOK 
<100 million NOK 
1 
2 
3 
A5 Major activity of company 
 
 
 
 
Please specify 
 
(If part of a larger conglomerate, circle the category most 
Agri /food industries  
Arms and defence  
Banking, finance and insurance 
Construction (roads, dams, tunnels, buildings, ships, etc.) 
Consultancy 
Light manufacturing (textiles, crockery, toys, etc.)   
Heavy industry, including mining and quarrying 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
                                                 
* tina.soreide@cmi.no or jon.vea@nho.no 
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applicable for your unit) Oil, gas and power generation/transmission 
Pharmaceutical/medicare  
Telecoms and IT 
Tourism, transportation and civilian aerospace 
Other kind of service  
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
A6 For how long has your company been operating with either 
trade or investments in foreign markets?  
0-10 years  
10-30 years 
more than 30 years 
1 
2 
3 
A7 
 
 
Are the prices for your main products or services pressed to 
a level that makes it hard to make profits?  
No 
Generally not 
Usually 
Yes 
1 
2 
3 
4 
A8 In which parts of the world does your firm do business? 
 
 
 
 
Please rank the three most important markets with numbers  
 
 
 
 
USA and Canada 
West and North European countries 
South European countries  
East European countries and central Asia  
Latin America and the Caribbean 
The Middle East and North Africa 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Mainland China (excl. Taiwan and Hong Kong)  
The rest of Asia 
Oceania 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
... 
A9 Is part of your firm’s production located outside of 
Norway?  
 
No 
Yes, in other OECD countrie(s) 
Yes, outside the OECD area   
1 
2 
3 
A10 Have you ever traded with or carried out a project for a 
governmental institution in any of the foreign countries 
where you operate? 
     No 
 Yes, sporadically 
Yes, many times  
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
 
Experiences with unethical business practices 
B1 If any, please rank the three geographical areas in which 
unethical business practices are influencing your operations 
the most. 
 
 
 
 
Please rank with numbers  
 
USA and Canada 
West and North European countries 
South European countries  
Latin America and the Caribbean 
East European countries and central Asia  
The Middle East and North Africa 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Mainland China (excl. Taiwan and Hong Kong)  
The rest of Asia 
Oceania 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
... 
B2 Do you ever experience a gap between formal and informal 
rules in any of the areas just mentioned?  
 
 
Never 
Seldom 
Frequently 
Often  
Always 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
B3 Do you ever experience that problems related to corruption 
impede foreign direct investments in any of the mentioned 
areas?  
 
 
 
 
Never 
Seldom 
Frequently 
Often  
Always 
We do not have the relevant experience 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
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I do not know 7 
B4 When competing for a contract in the areas mentioned, do 
you ever have reason to believe that your competitors 
influence tender procedures unduly?  
                                              Never 
Seldom 
Frequently 
Often 
Always            
1 
2 
3 
4 
5
B5 
 
a) Has your company ever decided not to operate in a 
specific country or region mainly because of 
corruption or similar problems? 
 
b) Has your company ever decided not to operate in a 
specific sector or segment of the market mainly 
because of corruption or similar problems? 
 
          a)                                                                                   No 
Yes 
I do not know 
 
          b)                                                                                  No  
Yes 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
 
1 
2 
3 
B6 Have you experienced that unethical business practices by 
competitors have placed your company in a more adverse 
competitive position?  
 
No 
We think  it has made us lose a contract(s)  
We are convinced that it has made us lose a contract(s)   
We often lose contracts because of corruption 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
B7 a)   If losing an important contract (probably) because of 
corruption, or similar practices, what is your most typical 
reaction(s)?  
 
 
Please circle all that apply 
 
 
b) If you generally chose not to complain, or if complaints 
are ignored or rejected, what do you typically do? 
 
 
 
 
No big reaction, corruption is part of the game 
We ask for a formal explanation from the customer 
We lodge an appeal to the customer or the tender authorit ies 
We prefer not to report the case 
We retreat  from the country 
I do not know 
 
No big reaction, corruption is part of the game 
We adjust our strategies to the business culture  
We retreat from the country 
We report the case in alternative ways 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
B8 Independently of the experiences of your own business 
unit, what do you think is the most common reason for a 
company to keep quiet when encountering a competitor in 
bribery?  
 
 
 
Please rank  the most important alternatives with numbers 
Concern about sanctions from the bribing company  
Concern about sanctions from other companies  
Concern about future business cooperation 
Concern about sanctions from customers 
Lack of knowledge about the illegality of the act 
Lack of proof 
 
Other? Please specify-------------------------------------------- 
I do not know 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
B9 Would you be more inclined to react on such bribery if it 
takes place within a country where corruption is perceived 
to be unusual?  
Yes 
No 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
B10 a) Has your company ever carried out a project in a 
foreign country as a joint venture or as a part of a 
consortium?  
 
b) If so, has your company ever experienced that a 
cooperating firm has aimed at influencing clients 
in a way that you find difficult to acknowledge?  
 
 
c) And if yes on (b), did your company (typically) 
utter some kind of reaction against this practice? 
 
           a)                                                                                Yes 
No 
I do not know 
 
           b)                                                                                Yes 
No 
I do not know   
 
           c)                                                                                Yes 
No 
1 
2 
3 
 
1 
2 
3 
 
1 
2 
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I do not know 3 
B11 a) Have any of your projects ever been financed by 
either bilateral or multilateral aid?  
 
 
 
b) If so, do you have the impression that there is more 
or less corruption, or similar trade of influence, 
connected to aid projects? 
 
Yes 
No 
I do not know 
 
No difference compared to other projects  
More  
Less 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Intermediaries, advisers and agents 
C1 Does your company have contacts positioned at, or with 
access to, a high level of the government in any of the 
countries where you operate? 
 
 
Please circle all that apply 
 
No 
Yes, in Norway  
Yes, in some other countries within the OECD area 
Yes, in foreign countries with a less familiar culture 
 Yes, in all the countries where we operate 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
C2 
 
 
 
 
What kind of assistance is typically preferred by your 
company when entering foreign markets? 
 
 
 
Please rank  the most important alternatives with numbers 
 
Agents and advisors with ties to relevant decision-makers 
Bureaucrats and/or politicians 
International business advisors and/or country analysts       
Relatives of people in governmental institutions 
Lawyers with the relevant competence  
 Agents able to deal with local formalities  
Local business advisors without ties to the government 
I do not know 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
C3 If relevant, what is the typical way for your company to 
compensate a middleman? 
 
 
Please circle all the answers that apply 
 
Periodic payments 
A lump sum 
A pre-agreed percentage share of the total contract amount 
A success-fee   
A combination 
Other  
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
C4 Given that you reimburse the agent in terms of a share of 
the total contract, what is the typical percentage?   
 
 
 
1-5% 
6-10% 
11-15% 
Above 15% 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Tenders and negotiations  
D1 Does your company place any effort in obtaining or 
maintaining a relationship to a potential customer prior to 
pre-qualification for a contract?  
 
No, this is not important 
Yes, this is an obvious benefit  
Yes, this is essential 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
D2 Are you ever able to influence or asked to advise clients on 
tender specifications?  
 
 
                                              Never 
Seldom 
Frequently 
Often 
Always 
I do not know            
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
D3 Does it ever happen that tender specifications are designed 
to fit with the offer of one specific company?  
 
 
                                              Never 
Seldom 
Frequently 
Often 
Always 
I do not know            
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
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D4 Will there often be negotiations between the tender 
participants and the decision-makers during the tender 
procedure?  
 
No 
Usually not 
Sometimes 
Yes, we negotiate at all stages of the procedure 
Yes, but all communication during tender is copied to all 
participating companies 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
 
5 
6 
D5 Do you consider standardised tender rules (like 
international competitive bidding) an obstacle to corruption 
and similar ways of making influence on clients?  
No, tender rules are not an obstacle to corruption  
Tender rules do not necessarily prevent corruption 
Generally, tender rules do prevent corruption  
Yes, tender rules prevent corruption efficiently  
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
D6 In which geographical areas, if any, do you typically 
experience that standardized procurement procedures are 
not applied when contracts are awarded?   
 
 
 
Please circle all the areas that apply. 
 
USA and Canada 
West and North European countries 
South European countries  
East European countries and central Asia  
Latin America and the Caribbean 
The Middle East and North Africa 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Mainland China (excl. Taiwan and Hong Kong)  
The rest of Asia 
Oceania 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
D7 When operating internationally, do you ever experience a 
demand for a quid pro quo, like the use of local resources, 
the building of infrastructure or other contributions to the  
local society?  
 
 
Never 
Seldom  
Frequently 
Often 
Always 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
D8 Have any state institutions from Norway ever taken part in 
the negotiations to ensure a contract, or to guarantee for 
financial aspects? 
No  
Yes 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
D9 Have you ever experienced that a competitor has won a 
contract by help of political pressure? 
 
No 
Yes 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
D10 Do you perceive your industry free and unbiased when it 
comes to the international competition for important 
contracts?  
 
 
No, the procedures are always biased 
The procedures are often biased 
The procedures are sometimes biased 
The procedures are seldom biased 
The procedures are never biased  
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Operating in markets where corruption is more common 
E1 When operating in foreign markets, do you ever have to pay 
some irregular “additional payments” to get things done?  
Never 
Seldom 
Sometimes 
Frequently 
Often 
Always 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
E2 What is the maximum acceptable size of such payments in 
your industry?  
0 - 1000 NOK 
1 000 - 10 000 NOK 
10 000 -50 000 NOK 
50 000 -100 000 NOK 
Above 100 000 NOK 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
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I do not know 6 
E3 
 
Is it required to offer valuable gifts or pay a bribe to clients 
or public officials, directly or through an agent, to be able 
to operate in certain countries?   
 
 
 
 
Please circle all the geographical areas that apply 
 
 
USA and Canada 
West and North European countries 
South European countries  
East European countries and central Asia  
Latin America and the Caribbean 
The Middle East and North Africa 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Mainland Ch ina (excl. Taiwan and Hong Kong)  
The rest of Asia 
Oceania 
I do not know                       
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11
E4 How common would you expect it to be, for companies in 
your line of business, to influence clients by help of 
corruption or similar undue business practices? 
 
 
I think it never happens 
I think it happens in around 1-10% of the cases  
I think it happens in around 10-20% of the cases 
I think it happens in 20-30% of the cases  
I think it happens in more than 30% of the cases 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
E5 If companies in your line of business operate unduly, for 
instance by establishing secret ties to specific decision-
makers, what would you suggest that they typically would 
be aiming at?  
 
 
 
Please rank  the most important alternatives with numbers 
Adjustments in tender specifications 
Being part of a bid for a larger contract or concession 
Improve economic conditions, like tax reductions  
Obtain the contract through direct negotiations 
Secret information about evaluation or tender specifications 
Secret information about the other companies’ bids 
Promises of neglected quality controls  
Reduce political risk  
 
Other benefits? Please specify    ……………………………. 
I do not know 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
 
… 
… 
E6 Under what circumstances could it be acceptable for a 
company to influence clients by help of a significant 
benefit, a valuable gift or a bribe?  
 
 
As long as the firm may end up with an important contract 
When there is no other way of operating in the market 
When the contract is necessary to avoid insolvency 
It is not accepted under any circumstances 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
E7 Does your own company sometimes provide clients with 
less tradable benefits, like … 
 
 
 
 
 
Please circle all that apply 
excursions and trips? 
promises of career opportunities in the firm?  
a seat in the company board?  
education for their children?  
tickets to expensive sports -arrangements, musicals, etc.? 
 
Other benefits? Please specify    ……………………………. 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
6 
7 
E8 To your knowledge, has your company ever accepted a 
request from an agent, an adviser or a consultant about 
money that probably would be applied for bribery?  
No 
Probably not 
Probably  
Yes 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
E9 Has your own company during the last decade tried to 
obtain a contract, a license or a concession in a way that is 
important to keep confidential?  
 
No 
Seldom 
Probably not  
Probably 
Often  
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
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E10 Would you be informed if someone in your company paid a 
bribe, on behalf of the company, to obtain an important  
contract or a significant benefit?  
No 
Probably not 
Probably  
Certainly 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
E11 a) Would you, generally, be able to discover it if a 
significant part of the compensation to an agent is 
applied for bribery?  
 
b) Have you ever considered it a benefit not to be 
informed if the agent applies the compensation for 
questionable payments? 
         
No 
Yes 
I do not know 
 
No 
Yes 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
 
1 
2 
3 
E12 Considering the following alternatives, what would you 
suggest is the most important underlying motivation for 
companies in your line of business to offer bribes?  
 
 
 
‘The fear of losing contracts because someone else has bribed 
the decision-makers’ 
‘Because the goods or services offered would never be chosen 
in a fair competition’ 
‘To persuade decision-makers to buy goods or services that 
otherwise would not have been demanded’ 
 I do not know 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
4 
Perceptions about Scandinavian conditions 
F1 Do you think Scandinavian companies in general are less or 
more likely to pay bribes than companies from other OECD 
countries? 
 
Less  
No difference 
More 
1 
2 
3 
F2 Do you think Scandinavian companies are less or more 
exposed to demands for bribes than companies from other 
countries?  
Less 
No difference 
More 
1 
2 
3 
F3 Do you generally perceive the competition for important 
contracts free and fair when operating in Scandinavia?  
 
No, the procedures are always biased 
The procedures are often biased 
The procedures are sometimes biased 
The procedures are seldom biased 
Yes, the procedures are never biased  
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
F4 Do you think corruption and similar ways of making 
influence on clients, affect the outcome of tender 
procedures in Norway?  
 
Never 
Seldom 
Sometimes 
Frequently 
Often 
Always 
I do not know  
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Control 
G1 Do you think anti-corruption efforts made by your own 
business organization have influenced the attitudes against 
bribery in your company?  
No 
No, we already had a clear attitude against bribery 
Yes, it has influenced our attitude to some extent 
Yes, it has clearly altered our attitude 
I am not familiar with their campaigns 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
G2 a) Are you familiar with the OECD-convention against 
bribery of foreign public officials?  
  
 
b) Are most employees in relevant positions informed by 
the company about the content of this convention? 
a)                                                                                     No 
Yes 
 
b)                                                                                     No 
Yes 
1 
2 
 
1 
2 
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I do not know 3 
G3 Given that you are familiar with the Norwegian anti-
corruption legislation, do you find it difficult to respect? 
 
 
 
 
If yes, please specify why? 
(There is more space for comments on the last page) 
 
No 
Usually not 
Often 
Yes 
I am not familiar with the legislation on this area 
 
------------------------------------------------------ 
 
------------------------------------------------------ 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
G4 What do you consider the major reason for not paying 
bribes when operating in foreign markets? 
 
 
 
 
Please rank  the most important alternatives with numbers 
 
It is illegal 
It is immoral 
It may harm the reputation 
It may place our employees in an unsafe situation 
It is expensive 
Accounting practices make it difficult  
 It is not part of our company culture  
Corruption disturbs the function of markets 
I do not know 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
G5 a) Does your company have a set of internal written 
codes of conduct that restricts employees from 
paying bribes? 
 
b) Do you have routines to detect violations of these 
codes?  
 
 
c) What is the typical reaction from the company if a 
serious violation of ethical codes (like corruption) 
is detected?  
 
 
No 
Yes  
 
No 
Yes, we some routines  
Yes, we have efficient routines  
 
No big reaction 
Internal discussions  
Internal inquiry 
Investigation by an external committee or consultancy 
Involve the police  
I do not no 
1 
2 
 
1 
2 
3 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
G6 Do you have efficient routines to detect false consultancy 
fees, fake invoices or illegal transactions, made for instance 
to avoid taxes?  
 
No  
Yes  
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
G7 a) Do you have routines to detect your own 
employees in receiving bribes?  
 
 
b) Has your company ever detected an employee in 
receiving a bribe? 
 
No 
Yes 
I do not know 
 
No 
Yes 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
 
1 
2 
3 
G8 Does your company encourage employees to report the case 
internally if they uncover bribery or other types of crime 
carried out by the firm? 
No 
Not actively 
Yes, we do 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
G9 
 
 
a) Has your company’s attitude towards corruption 
changed during the last years?  
 
 
 
 
b) If your attitude has changed, when do you think 
          a)                                                                                   No 
Yes, paying bribes was more accepted previously 
Yes, paying bribes was less accepted previously  
I do not know 
 
          b)                                                                   Last autumn  
1 
2 
3 
4 
 
1 
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the change took place?  
 
 
 
 
c) Do you think the competition for important 
contracts in your industry has become more fair 
and unbiased during the last years? 
 
During the last two years 
During the last five years  
During the last decade 
I do not know 
 
          c)                                                                                   No 
Yes 
I do not know 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
1 
2 
3 
We would appreciate any thoughts you might like to add related to your responses or to the topic in general. Comments on this survey are 
of course also welcome. (Please add a sheet if the space here is too limited) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your contribution! 
 
Explanation to terms in use 
An agent is a company or a person that assis t you in facilitating the business in a foreign country. The term 
includes intermediaries, middlemen, information brokers and advisors on local business. The representative is 
not an employee of the firm.  
Alternative ways of reporting on corruption, in cases where a complaint to the tender authorities is (expected to 
be) ignored, are to inform newspapers (either in the country of business or in the home-country of the bribing 
firm), political authorities, embassies, anti-corruption groups, etc. 
Bribe: In this survey we mainly refer to grand scale corruption, generous gifts offered typically to influence the 
assignment of important contracts. The receiver of the bribe is often, but not always, employed by the state. 
Business relates to export and imports of goods and services, also included are foreign direct investments. The 
term does not refer to strictly financial investments.  
Consortium: An international business and/or banking agreement that includes more than two companies, often 
with the aim of cooperating on a larger business project or to control a significant share of a market. The 
responsibility of each company is restricted to what it delivers in the specific project.  
Corruption: Corruption is often defined as the misuse of entrusted authority for private gain. An official 
demands or is offered a bribe, in money or other values, either to do what s/he is supposed to do in any case or to 
make a certain decision that probably not would have been made without the bribe.  
Foreign Direct Investment  (FDI) is the acquisition abroad of physical assets, such as plant and equipment, with 
operating control residing in the parent corporation. Greenfield investment is the form of FDI where you invest 
in new facilities rather than acquiring already operating firms.   
International Competitive Bidding  (ICB) refers to tender rules that are developed to provide all eligible 
prospective bidders with timely and adequate notification of a tender and an equal opportunity to bid for the 
contract.  
Joint venture: Partnership or cooperative agreement between two or more companies restricted to a single 
specific project. Each company will typically have joint liability.   
OECD countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United 
States. 
OECD-convention: The OECD Convention on Comb ating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions entered into force on February 15, 1999. The Convention makes it a crime to offer, 
promise or give a bribe to a foreign public official in order to obtain or retain international business deals. 
  53 
Appendix 2: The embassy survey questionnaire 
Corruption Survey                                           
 
This questionnaire is part of a Norwegian survey on corruption in international business transactions. It is carried 
out by CMI researcher Tina Søreide in cooperation with NHO. The study is part of a Ph.D. project at the 
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration (NHH) and financed by The Norwegian Research 
Council (NFR).  
 
Corruption, or similar ways of making influence on decision-makers, is a challenge for those who want to enter 
or operate in certain markets. The objective of this survey is to examine some aspects of the problem, and 
particularly how Norwegian firms encounter unethical business practices when operating in foreign areas. 
Information is gathered by help of questionnaires and interviews in the headquarters of Norwegian firms. This 
part of the project aims at complementing the study by addressing Norwegian embassies and consulates with a 
few questions.  
 
The data collected will be applied for research purposes. The information obtained will be treated strictly 
anonymously and confidentially. Neither your name nor the name of your country of operation will be 
mentioned in any document related to this study. In fact, the procedures applied prevent us from obtaining 
identifiable information. Any questions can be directed to Tina Søreide at CMI or Jon Vea at NHO.*   
    
Questionnaire  
1 
 
How would you categorize your area or country of operation? 
 
Developing country  
Medium income country  
Rich country 
1 
2 
3 
2 
 
How frequently do you think corruption is part of the business culture 
in your country of operation?  
 
 
 
Please circle the answer that applies the most 
Never 
Seldom 
Sometimes 
Frequently 
Often 
Always 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
3 How often would you assume that Norwegian firms operating in the 
area are confronted with challenges related to illegitimate business 
practices, irregular payments and corruption?  
 
 
Never 
Seldom 
Sometimes 
Frequently 
Often 
Constantly  
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
4 Will adjustment to local informal conventions in your country of 
operation ever imply business procedures that would be considered 
less acceptable in Norway?  
 
 
 
 
 
Never 
Seldom 
Sometimes 
Frequently 
Often 
Always 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
5 Is it likely that the refusal of making irregular or informal payments 
might reduce the opportunities for foreign firms to make business in 
your country of operation?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
No 
Seldom  
Sometimes 
Frequently 
Often 
In general, yes 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
                                                 
* tina.soreide@cmi.no or jon.vea@nho.no 
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6 Do you ever notice that foreign firms that operate in the area make use 
of business practices that most likely deviate from their own official 
codes of conduct?  
 
Never 
Seldom 
Sometimes 
Frequently 
Often 
Always 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 Would you recommend Norwegian firms to adjust to local culture, 
even if it could imply business behaviour that would not be accepted 
in Norway? 
 
 
 
No 
Seldom 
Maybe 
Sometimes 
Usually 
Yes 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
8 Given that a Norwegian firm has lost an important contract due to 
corruption, would you be willing to mention the issue to local 
authorities?  
 
 
 
No 
Probably not 
Probably  
Certainly  
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
9 Have you ever reacted against corruption by raising the issue at a 
higher political level?  
 
 
No 
It has happened 
Several times 
1 
2 
3 
We would appreciate any thoughts you might like to add related to your responses or to the topic in general. (Please add a sheet if the space 
here is too limited) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your contribution! 
 
Summary 
 
 
This report presents a study of corruption in international 
markets by exploring the perspectives of Norwegian firms, 
their challenges, their experiences and their preferred 
strategies. The study consists of three parts, (i) interviews at 
executive level in seven large firms, (ii) a business-survey, 
where 82 firms with a headquarter in Norway responded to a 
questionnaire, and (iii) a survey of Norwegian embassies 
outside the OECD-region.  
Six issues have motivated the study: (1) The choices firms 
make when experiencing a business climate that is worse 
than expected prior to entry; (2) the reluctance to speak out 
on corruption; (3) the link between corruption and market 
power; (4) the impact of improved procurement procedures; 
(5) the grey zones of facilitation payments, marketing 
strategies and political pressure; and (6) business strategies 
versus their expressed attitudes and codes of conduct.  
The study is conducted in collaboration with NHO, The 
Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry.  
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